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Abstract
This study examines the consequences of a) a domestic carbon tax policy, and, b)
participation in a global tradable emission permits regime on carbon emissions, Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), and poverty, in India. The results, based a computable general
equilibrium model of the Indian economy, show that a carbon tax policy that simply
recycles carbon tax revenues to households imposes heavy costs in terms of lower
economic growth and higher poverty. However, the fall in GDP and rise in poverty can
be minimized or even prevented if the emission restriction target is a very mild one and
tax revenues are transferred to the poor. A soft emission reduction target is all that
India needs to set for itself, given that even a ten percent annual reduction in aggregate
emissions will bring down its per capita emissions to a level far below global per capita
emissions. On the other hand, participation in the tradable emission permits regime
opens up an opportunity for India to sell surplus permits. India would then be able to
use the revenues from permits to speed up GDP growth and poverty reduction and
keep its per capita emission below the 1990 per capita global emissions level.
Key words: CGE model, carbon emissions, economic growth, poverty reduction, India,
climate change, carbon tax policy, tradable emission permits.
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The Trade-Off Among Carbon Emissions, Economic Growth and
Poverty Reduction in India
Vijay Prakash Ojha
1.  Introduction
The linkage between carbon emission reduction, economic growth and poverty
alleviation is an issue of immense relevance for India. India is highly vulnerable toglobal warming and global climate change caused by emissions of greenhouse gasessuch as carbon dioxide. The adverse effects of climate change would in all likelihood
retard the developmental process and aggravate poverty. At the same time, Indias percapita carbon emission is already very low. It is 0.26 tonne per annum, which is one-fourth of the world average per capita emission of one tonne per annum (Parikh et al,
1991). In other words, Indias per capita contribution to global warming problem is arelatively minor one. However, because of its large and growing population, its totalemissions are large. Internationally, India is expected to stabilize its energy related
carbon emissions1. Moreover, the fact that India has a real stake in a global policyregime to stabilize global carbon emissions is being realized in Indian policy circles.More specifically, Indian policy makers are beginning to see the need to understand
the implications for India of a Kyoto-type global emissions trading regime.
At the domestic level, India is concerned with the reduction of carbon emissions whether
a global system of tradable emission permits materializes or not. This concern, however,is a very long term one. Switching over to non-polluting sources of energy such as,hydro and nuclear, is often mentioned as a strategy that will sweep away the problem
of carbon emissions. A medium term policy option such as a carbon tax, however, isviewed with suspicion, largely because of its likely adverse impact on economic growthand poverty reduction. For a low-income country like India, the more pressing need
obviously is achieving poverty reduction rather than controlling carbon emissions.Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile exploring how much, if at all, carbon taxes trade-off growth and poverty reduction, and what compensatory mechanisms can be built
into the system to mitigate the undesirable effects of carbon taxes on GDP growth andpoverty alleviation.
This study seeks to answer three questions related to policy trade-offs between carbon
emission reduction, growth and poverty: a) what are the economic and distributionalimpacts of imposing carbon taxes when tax revenues are recycled back into theeconomy? b) How do the effects on growth and poverty change if emission targets are
1  India is the fifth-largest emitter of fossil-fuel-derived carbon dioxide, and its total emissions grew at an
annual average rate of almost 6 percent in the 1990s (Marland et al , 2001). Moreover, Sagar (2002, 3925)
argues that : the pressure already on them (developing countries), to show meaningful participation is
likely to intensify in the continuing negotiation, making it quite likely that they will have to take on some
commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in the post-Kyoto phase.  Even though its
(Indias) annual per capita emissions for 1998 of 0.3 tonnes of carbon are well below the global average of
1.1 tonnes per capita, the size of its (Indias) aggregate emissions makes its participation in any future
developing country commitment regime a foregone conclusion.
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Notes: 1. Refined Oil and LPG includes non-energy use of gas and fuel oil for fertiliser and
petrochemical production.
2. For hydro, nuclear and renewables, energy is the coal equivalent for electricity generation
3. Other includes nuclear, wind, solar etc.
4. The italicized figures in the parantheses show the percentages with respect to the total.
Source : Authors estimates based on CMIE Energy and TEDDY (2002/03).
lowered and tax revenues are transferred directly to the poor? And c) How are GDPgrowth, poverty and carbon emissions affected if India participates in a global tradableemissions regime? These issues are addressed by using a Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) Model of the Indian economy.
1.1  The energy and emissions scene in India
In India, about 30% of the total energy requirements are still met by the traditional or
non-commercial sources of energy like fuelwood, crop residue, animal waste and animaldraught power. The share of these non-commercial forms of energy in the total energyconsumption has, however, been on decline. It was as high as 50% in 1970-71, but
came down to only 33% in 1990-91. In other words, the energy consumption patternhas been increasingly shifting in favor of the commercial forms of energy like coal,refined oil , natural gas, and electricity. So much so, that in the last four decades,
growth rate of  commercial energy consumption has been higher than that of the totalenergy consumption. Coal itself  accounts for more than 37% of the total energyconsumption in 1990-91, with the share of refined oil and natural gas being about 18%
and 5% respectively. The non-fossil sources of energy, such as, hydro-electricity has asmall share of about 6.5%, with the remaining 0.5% share of the total energyconsumption being accounted for by the non-conventional energy sources, such as,
nuclear, wind and solar power.
In the two decades from 1970 to 1990, energy consumption in India has more thandoubled (table 1). More importantly, during this period biomass, which is a carbonneutral fuel (Ravindranath and Somsekhar, 1995), has been increasingly substituted bythe fossil fuels, mainly coal. This has resulted in a major increase in the level of carbonemissions in India (table 2 ).
Table 1 : Energy consumption in India (petajoules)
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000 2005 
Lignite 19 
(0.39) 
29 
(0.48) 
44 
(0.62) 
77 
(0.85) 
130 
(1.12) 
216 
(1.22) 
259 
(1.21) 
Coal 1466 
(29.77) 
1910 
(31.81) 
2222 
(31.07) 
3124 
(34.49) 
4201 
(36.10) 
8498 
(48.07) 
10198 
(47.58) 
Refined 
Oil & LPG 
622 
(12.63) 
799 
(13.31) 
1082 
(15.13) 
1480 
(16.34) 
2035 
(17.49) 
2813 
(15.91) 
3785 
(17.68) 
Natural Gas 42 
(0.85) 
79 
(1.32) 
86 
(1.20) 
270 
(2.98) 
606 
(5.21) 
815 
(4.61) 
1156 
(5.39) 
Biomass 2492 
(50.61) 
2821 
(46.98) 
3202 
(44.77) 
3518 
(38.83) 
3866 
(33.22) 
4456 
(25.20) 
5052 
(23.67) 
Hydropower 258 
(5.24) 
334 
(5.56) 
484 
(6.77) 
540 
(5.96) 
723 
(6.21) 
744 
(4.21) 
775 
(3.62) 
Other 25 
(0.51) 
33 
(0.55) 
32 
(0.45) 
49 
(0.54) 
74 
(0.64) 
138 
(0.78) 
211 
(0.99) 
Total 4924 
(100) 
6005 
(100) 
7152 
(100) 
9059 
(100) 
11636 
(100) 
17680 
(100) 
21437 
(100) 
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Table 2 : Energy consumption and carbon emission trends
Notes : Net carbon emission excludes emissions from biomass combustion.
Gross carbon emission includes emissions from biomass combustion.
PJ : petajoules,  MT : metric tons
Source: Fisher-Vanden et al (1997) & Marland, Gregg, Tom Boden, Robert J Andres (2003).
In the 1980s, the Indian economy grew at an average annual rate of 5%, with industrialoutput rising at about 6.3% per year. During this time, Indias commercial energy sectorgrew at about 6% a year, with electricity use growing faster at 9% annually. In the
post-liberalization (i.e., after 1990-91) phase, the Indian economy averaged a higherannual growth rate of about 6%. Indias energy demand can only grow even morerapidly in the future on account of high prospective economic growth, spreading
industrial base, a rapid population growth and increasingly energy-intensive consumptionpatterns that results from higher incomes. In fact, projections show that Indias energydemand could increase four-fold by 2025, while its carbon emissions could increase
six-fold as traditional biomass fuels are replaced by higher fossil fuel use.
1.2   Policies for carbon emissions reduction
The standard policy measures for greenhouse gases abatement are basically four -energy efficiency improvement measures, command-and-control measures (i.e.,
implementing emission reduction targets by decree), domestic carbon taxes and aninternational emissions trading regime of the kind envisaged for the Annex B countries2in the Kyoto protocol. Of these while the first one is, so to say, desirable per se, the
other three are regarded as policy alternatives.
A lot of avoidable CO2 emissions is due to the rampant energy inefficiency, which, inturn is the result of energy subsidies still prevailing in India, as in many other countries.
However, since the early nineties, there is an increasing realization of the link between
energy inefficiency and unnecessary CO2 emissions leading to a worldwide decline inenergy subsidies. In India also the energy subsidies have been reduced since the onsetof economic reforms in 1991. The reduction in the energy subsidies notwithstanding
final-use energy prices in India, again as in many other countries, are still well below
the opportunity cost (Fischer and Toman, 2000). In fact, the energy price reforms in
India are far from complete, and not surprisingly, they have, as yet, had only aninsignificant impact on energy efficiency and, thereby, on carbon emissions (Sengupta
and Gupta, 2004).
2 Annex B countries refer to the OECD countries, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and the
Russian Federation, which have agreed to emissions reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
The specific emissions reduction commitments of these countries are listed in Annex B of the Kyoto
Protocol, hence they are referred to as Annex B countries.
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 2000 2005 
Energy consumption (PJ) 4923 6005 7152 9059 11636 17680 21437
Net carbon emission (MT) 61.58 79.54 95.78 134.63 183.39 247.69 292.26
Gross carbon emission (MT) 129.64 156.59 183.23 230.72 288.99   
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Unlike the energy efficiency improvement measures, the other three measures for
emissions abatement - command-and-control, carbon taxes and international emissionstrading - are in India not yet at the implementation stage. As far as international emissionstrading is concerned, India threw its hat in the Kyoto ring a little too late. By the time
India acceded to the Kyoto protocol in August 2003 as a prelude to the eighth annualConference of Parties, which it was hosting, the protocol had already gone into abeyancebecause of USAs withdrawal from it. Gupta (2002) has infact argued that had India
been more proactive in its approach and acceded to the Kyoto protocol in its earlyphases, the American stand of not joining the protocol without any commitment fromthe developing countries would have become difficult to maintain. And the turn of events
could have been completely different.
Now (16 February 2005) that the Kyoto Protocal has come into force, the industrializedcountries are required to cut their combined emissions to 5% below 1990 levels by thefirst commitment period, 2008-2012. The developing countries have been absolved of
any responsibility towards reducing emissions in the first commitment period. This,however, is no reason for developing countries climate change should ultimately aim atfixing pollution rights or entitlements for each country according to some agreed upon
equity principles, and the Kyoto Protocol can be and may be viewed as a step in thisdirection (Chander, 2004: 272). In other words, once competitive emissions tradeamong Annex B countries is established, the developing countries will be able to better
assess the potential gains from such trade, and might be tempted to participate in aglobal emissions trade in the post-Kyoto phase of climate change negotiations.
The command-and-control measure, i.e., enforcing carbon emission reduction targetsby fiat is, not surprisingly, not regarded in India as feasible or desirable. Firstly, there
are the usual arguments of command-and-control measures being statically anddynamically inefficient as compared to say market-based instruments, such as, carbontaxes (Pearson, 2000). Secondly, under the command-and-control measure, the
economic cost of emission abatement (arising mainly due to curtailment of output, givenlimited input substitution possibilities) represents a deadweight loss in welfare. On theother hand, in case of a market-based instrument like carbon taxes, the government
can use the  tax revenue in a variety of ways to generate benefits for the economy inaddition to those resulting from reduced emissions, thereby, reducing the net loss inwelfare. It can use the carbon tax to replace some other more distorting tax and thus
garner efficiency gains for the economy, i.e., reap double-dividend (Pearson, 2000).Or what is more pertinent, in case of a developing economy like India, it can use thetax revenue for targeted transfers to reduce poverty, or more specifically, recycle the
carbon tax revenue to the low-income groups to compensate the latter for the burdenimposed on them by the carbon emission reduction strategy.
It follows that, although policy action in India for carbon emissions abatement, apart
from the ongoing energy price reform, has not yet materialized, the status-quo cannotbe maintained for long. Fortunately, the prelude to policy action, i.e., informed policydiscussion has been initiated in the literature on carbon emission reduction strategies in
India. Two policy instruments  domestic carbon taxes and internationally tradableemission permits  have been discussed in the literature on India. For the latter, Murthy,Panda and Parikh (2000) have shown, using an activity analysis framework, that India
stands to gain both in terms of GDP and poverty reduction, if the emission permits are
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allocated on the basis of equal per capita emission. Fischer-Vanden et al (1997) have
used a CGE model to compare the impacts of the two policy instruments on GDP, andfound that tradable permits are preferable to carbon taxes. In a comparison of the twotypes of schemes for emission permits  the grandfathered emission allocation scheme
in which permits are allocated on the basis of 1990 emissions, and the equal per capitaemission allocation scheme  they found the latter to be more beneficial for India.Incidentally, the CGE model of Fischer-Vanden et al (1997) is based on the assumption
of a single representative household. Hence, it does not reflect the impact of carbontaxes on income distribution or on the poverty ratio.
1.3   The present study
In the present study we have used a top-down, quasi-dynamic CGE model, with an
endogenous income distribution mechanism, for the Indian economy. Our model hasbeen formulated with a view to capture the adverse effects of carbon taxes on GDPlosses and the poverty ratio through increased prices of fossil fuels (coal, refined oil
and natural gas). The non-uniform increases in the prices of fossil fuels will lead tosome fuel switching as well as an overall fuel reducing effect. Our model will effectivelycapture the net impact of these effects on GDP as well as income distribution. Compared
to the model of Murthy, Panda and Parikh (2000), ours is a neoclassical price drivenCGE model, ideally suited for simulating the impact of a carbon tax and of a system ofglobal trade in carbon emission quotas. And compared to the CGE model of Fischer-
Vanden et al (1997)3 which is based on the assumption of a single representativehousehold, our model has an elaborate income and consumption distribution mechanism,in which factoral incomes are first mapped onto 15 income percentiles and then onto 5
consumption expenditure classes. The bottom consumption expenditure class corresp-onds to those below the poverty line so that we get a measure of the poverty ratio as
well.
As is usually done in a CGE modeling analysis, we first generate a business-as-usualscenario, and then simulate alternative policy scenarios for assessing the consequences
for growth and poverty in India of different carbon emission reduction strategies. Thespecific policy questions to which the policy scenarios are addressed are the following:
(i) What is the impact of imposing carbon taxes to ensure that aggregate carbon emissionsdo not exceed the 1990 levels in each period during the time span 1990-2020 given
that the carbon tax revenues for each period are recycled to the households by wayof additions to personal disposable income ?(ii) What is the impact of imposing carbon taxes to bring about a 10% annual reduction
in aggregate carbon emission levels during the time span 1990-2020 given that thecarbon tax revenues for each period are recycled to the households ?(iii)  What is the impact of participating in an internationally tradable permits scheme in
which the   carbon emission allowances are allocated on the basis of equal per capitaemissions allocation which are kept fixed to the participating countrys 1990population, when the revenues earned, if any, from the permits are recycled to the
households ?
3 The Fischer-Vanden et al (1997) study uses a nine-sector CGE model of the Indian economy based on the
Indian module of the Second Generation Model (SGM) version 0.0 detailed in Edmonds, Pitcher, Barns,
Baron and Wise (1993).
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There are two variants considered for each policy question mentioned above, one inwhich the revenues earned from carbon taxes or sale of emission permits are distributed
across household groups in proportions same as those for the routine government
transfers - i.e., the case of across-the-board transfers, and the other in which these
revenues are transferred exclusively to a target group, which consists of the four lowestincome classes (deciles) or the poorest 40% households in the economy- i.e., the case
of targeted transfers4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the overall structure
of the model, with special emphasis on the production structure, the production-CO2emission linkages and the income distribution mechanism. Section 3 presents the main
features, such as GDP growth and emissions growth, of the business-as-usual (BAU)
scenario. In section 4, we report the simulation results of eight alternative policy
scenarios in comparison with the BAU scenario. Section 5 concludes and suggestspolicy implications of our results. Appendix 1 gives the tables and figures related to
the BAU scenario and the policy simulations. In Appendix 2 we present the equations
of the model. Appendix 3 describes the database of the model.
2.  Model Structure
Our model is based on a neoclassical CGE framework that includes institutional featurespeculiar to the Indian economy. It is multi-sectoral and quasi-dynamic. The overall
structure of our model is similar to the one presented in Mitra (1994). However, informulating the details of the model - the production structure, the CO2 emissiongeneration and the income distribution mechanism - we follow an eclectic approach,
keeping in mind the focus on the linkages between inter-fossil-fuel substitutions, CO2emissions, GDP growth and poverty reduction.
The model includes the interactions of producers, households, the government and therest of the world in response to relative prices given certain initial conditions andexogenously given set of parameters. Producers act as profit maximizers in perfectly
competitive markets, i.e., they take factor and output prices (inclusive of any taxes) asgiven and generate demands for factors so as to minimize unit costs of output. Thefactors of production include intermediates, energy inputs and the primary inputs -
capital, land and different types of labour. For households, the initial factor endowmentsare fixed. They, therefore, supply factors inelastically. Their commodity-wise demandsare expressed, for given income and market prices, through the Stone-Geary linear
expenditure system (LES). Also households save and pay taxes to the government.Furthermore, households are classified into five rural and five urban consumerexpenditure groups. The government is not asssumed to be an optimizing agent. Instead,
goverment consumption, transfers and tax rates are exogenous policy instruments. Thetotal CO2 emissions in the economy are determined on the basis of the inputs of fossilfuels in the production process, the gross outputs produced and the consumption
demands of the households and the government, using fixed emission coefficients.
4 For a detailed description of the two types of transfer of revenues earned through carbon taxes or sale of
permits the across-the-board transfers and the targeted transfers  see section 2.10.
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The rest of the world supplies goods which are imperfect substitutes for domestic output to
the Indian economy, makes transfer payments and demands exports. The standard small-country assumption is made implying that India is a price-taker in import markets and canimport as much as it wants. However, because the imported goods are differentiated from
the domestically produced goods, the two varieties are aggregated using a constant elasticityof substitution (CES) function, based on the Armington assumption5. As a result, the importsof a given good depend on the relation between the prices of the imported and the
domestically produced varieties of that good. For exports, a downward sloping worlddemand curve is assumed. On the supply side, a constant elasticity of transformation (CET)function is used to define the output of a given sector as a revenue-maximizing aggregate of
goods for the domestic market and goods for the foreign markets. This implies that theresponse of the domestic supply of goods in favor or against exports depends upon theprice of those goods in the foreign markets vis-à-vis their prices in the domestic markets,
given the elasticity of transformation between goods for the two types of markets.
The model is Walrasian in character. Markets for all commodities and non-fixed factors -capital stocks are fixed and intersectorally immobile - clear through adjustment in prices.However, by virtue of Walras law, the model determines only relative prices. The overallprice index is chosen to be the numeraire and is, therefore, normalized to unity. With the(domestic) price level fixed exogenously,  the model determines endogenously both thenominal exchange rate and the foreign savings in the external closure (Robinson, 1999).Finally, because the aggregate investment is exogenously fixed, the model follows aninvestment-driven macro closure, in which the aggregate savings - i.e., the sum of household,government and foreign savings - adjusts, to satisfy the saving-investment balance.
2.1   Sectoral disaggregation
Our model is based on an eleven sector disaggregation of the Indian economy :
(i) Agriculture  (agricult),(ii) Electricity    (elec),
(iii) Coal  (coal),
(iv) Refined Oil  (refoil),
(v) Natural Gas  (nat-gas),(vi) Crude Petroleum  (crude-pet),
(vii) Transport  (trans),
(viii) Energy Intensive Industries  (enerint),
(ix) Other Intermediates including capital goods (otherint),(x) Consumer goods  (cons-good),
(xi) Services  (services) .
There are 5 energy sectors  elec, coal, refoil, nat-gas, crude-pet  and 6 non-energy
sectors - agricult, trans, enerint, otherint, cons-good and services. The sectoral division
of the economy was decided after a perusal of the sectoral disaggregation in various
other models - such as EPPA, SGM and Murthy, Panda and Parikh (2000) - andbearing in mind the focus of our model on the possibilities of fuel switching in the
provision of energy inputs in the production process.
5 The Armington assumption states that commodities imported and exported are imperfect susbtitutes of
domestically produced and used commodities. This assumption is necessary to take into account two-
way trade and, at the same time, avoid an unrealistically high degree of specialisation (Armington, 1969).
8 SANDEE Working Paper No. 12-05
2.2   The production structure
Production technologies for all sectors are defined using nested CES functions, with
the nesting structure of inputs differing across the sectors, or groups of sectors as in
the EPPA model (Babiker et al, 2001 and Yang et al, 1996).
For the transport, energy intensive industries, other intermediates, consumer goods
and services sectors, the following tree describes the production structure (fig. 1).
                                               Fig. 1 : The production structure
Domestic Sectoral Gross Output (X)
Non-Energy Intermediate (N) Energy-Labour-Capital Aggregate ( Z )
Inputs Aggregate
Domestic Imported
Intermediate Intermediate
Inputs Aggregate (Nd ) Inputs Aggregate (Nm)
Energy-Aggregate (EA) Value-Added (VA)
Electricity (E) Non-Electricity (NE) K Ls Lw
Coal (CL) Gas (GS) Refined Oil (RO)
Note : K  Capital ; Ls  Self-employed labour ; Lw  Wage-labour.
In case of the remaining sectors, there are minor variations in the nesting structure. For
coal, natural-gas, crude petroleum and refined oil, there is an extra layer at the topcombining non-fixed factor inputs aggregate (NF) and fixed factor input (f) to produce
domestic gross output. In the electricity sector, the non-electricity inputs bundle is
formed in two stages instead of one  i.e., first coal and refined oil are combined to
form coal-oil aggregate (COIL) and the latter subsequently combines with natural gas(GS) to form non-electricity inputs aggregate (NE). In agriculture, at the top level of
the nesting structure, the domestic gross output is produced as a combination of resource
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intensive bundle (RS) and value added (VA), where the former is made up of land andenergy-materials (EM) aggregate. The latter in turn is an Armington combination of non-energy
intermediate inputs bundle (N) and energy aggregate (EA).
In other words, for each sector there is a nested tree-type production function. Ateach level of the nested production function, the assumption of constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) and constant returns to scale (CRS) is made6. For every level, the
producers problem is to minimize cost (or maximize profit) given the factor and output
prices and express demands for inputs. It follows that for every level, the followingthree relationships hold : the CES function relating output to inputs, the first order
conditions, and the product exhausation theorem. For all the levels taken together, the
production system thus determines, for each sector, the gross domestic output, the
input demands, value-added as well as the demands for wage-labour and self-employedlabour7.
2.3   Technological change
Energy-saving technological progress is incorporated in our model by making the
autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI) assumption used in other carbon
emission reduction models such as, GREEN (Burniaux et al, 1992) and EPPA (Babiker
et al, 2001). As in the EPPA and GREEN models, we also assume that AEEI occurs inall sectors except the primary energy sectors (coal, crude petroleum and natural gas)
and the refined oil sector. The GREEN model assumes a one percent annual increase
in energy efficiency, while in the EPPA model there is an even higher annual growth
rate of energy efficiency  1.4 percent initially, though it slows down over time accordingto a logistic function. However, we are of the opinion that the exogenous annual growth
rates of energy efficiency assumed for India in these models are overly optimistic.
India has embarked on the path towards energy efficiency after 1991, but its record in
energy efficiency improvement in the last one decade is far from encouraging (Senguptaand Gupta, 2004). We have thus assumed a much more modest annual growth rate of
energy efficiency for the Indian economy  i.e., 0.5 percent.
2.4   Carbon emissions
CO2 is emitted owing to burning of fossil fuel inputs. The major fossil fuels used inIndia are coal,  natural gas, refined oil and crude petroleum8. In addition to CO2 emittedby fuel combustion, there may be CO2 emanating from the very process of outputgeneration. For example, the cement sector (a part of the enerint sector in our sectoral
classification) releases CO2 in the limestone calcination process. Finally, CO2 emissionsalso result from the final consumption of households and the government.
6 Although, the domestic and intermediate inputs aggregates themselves are fixed-coefficients aggregates
of domestic and imported  inputs respectively from the non-energy sectors.
7 The capital stock in a particular period is given, so that the first-order condition effectively  determines
the sectoral return on capital.
8 Note that crude petroleum is used exclusively as an input in the refined oil sector (see Appendix 2).
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We use fixed CO2 emission coefficients to calculate the sector-specific CO2 emissionsfrom each of the three sources of carbon emissions. For the total CO2 emissionsgenerated in the economy, we first aggregate the emissions from each of the sources
over the eleven sectors and subsequently sum up the aggregate emissions  across the
three sources.
2.5   Carbon Taxes
Carbon taxes are applicable only on the CO2 emitted in the production process (i.e.,on the first two sources of carbon emissions), not on the final consumption of households
and the government (the third source of carbon emissions). Carbon taxes are based on
the proportion of each fuels carbon content, i.e., Rs per ton of carbon emitted. The
carbon tax rate multiplied by a sectors carbon emission gives the carbon emission taxpayments by that sector. Summing across sectors we get the total carbon tax payments,
which is then  recycled to the household sector as additional transfer payments by the
government. (In the BAU scenario, the carbon tax rate is fixed at zero and there are,
therefore, no carbon tax payments). It may be noted that, the producers cost functionis modified to include the carbon emission taxes so that these taxes induce a substitution
in favor of lower carbon-emitting fossil fuels (see equations 35-38 in Appendix 2). A
carbon tax is translated into price increases for each of the fossil fuels  coal, refined
oil and natural gas. The price increase is maximum for coal which has the highest carboncontent, followed by refined oil and natural gas. In response, a cost minimizing (or a
profit maximizing) producer changes the input mix away from coal and towards refined
oil and natural gas.
2.6   Investment
Public and private investment is fed into the model as two distinct constituents of thetotal investment. There are fixed share parameters for distributing the aggregate
investment across sectors of origin. However, the allocation mechanisms for sectors of
destination are different in the two cases of public and private investment. For public
investment there is discretionary allocation, and the allocation ratios are set exogenously.On the other hand, for private investment the allocation ratios are given in a particular
period, but are revised from period to period on the basis of sectoral relative returns
on capital. The relative return on capital in any sector is given by the normalization of
the implicit price of capital in that sector to the economy-wide returns. This rule doesnot imply full factor price equalization, but only a sluggish reallocation of investment
from sectors where rate of return is low to ones having higher rates of return.
Needless to say, this bifurcation of total investment into its public and private componentswith their differing allocation mechanisms is an attempt to approximate the way
investments are actually made in the Indian economy. Incidentally, it also allows for
public investments to be directed towards strategic sectors disregarding short-run
considerations of profit maximization.
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2.7   Capital stocks
Sectoral capital stocks are exogenously given at the beginning of a particular period.However, our model is recursively dynamic, which means that it is run for many periods
as a sequence of equilibria. Between two periods there will be additions to capital
stocks in each sector because of the investment undertaken in that sector in the previous
period. More precisely, sectoral capital stocks for any year are arrived at by addingthe investments by sectors of destination, net of depreciation, in year t-1 to the sectoral
capital stocks at the beginning of the year t-1.
2.8   Labour markets and wage rates
For the non-agricultural sectors (i.e. sectors 2-11), the total labour supply available
for employment is exogenously given. From this stock of labour those who are unable
to find wage-employment resort to self-employment. In the agricultural sector, on the
other hand, there is a fixed supply of self-employed labour (those owning land ofwhatever size) and, over and above, there is a pool of labour (landless) waiting to to
find employment. Those who are unable to find wage employment become openly
unemployed, rather than resort to self-employment.
The real wage rates, for wage labour, in the current period are indexed to the previousperiods wage rates. This rule is applied to both the agricultural and non-agricultural
wage rates. In the non- agricultural sectors, those unable to find wage employment (at
the adjusted wage rate) spill over into the pool of self-employed labour to clear thelabour market. In other words, there is inflexible wage (keynesian) in the organized
sector and a market-clearing remuneration rate for the self-employed in the
unorganized sector (neo-classical).
2.9   Factor incomes and transfers
Factor incomes - i.e, self-employment incomes, wage incomes, incomes from rentaccruing to fixed factors including land, and capital (profit) incomes are generated by
summing the product of factor remunerations and their employment levels over all the
sectors. From these, taxes are netted out to arrive at disposable incomes. To these
five types of income is added a sixth type  transfer payments by government and restof the world. Through these transfer payments the government can recycle the total
carbon tax revenues to the households. Factor incomes by region  rural and urban 
are worked out for each of the six types of income using fixed shares to split these
factor incomes into two parts, one for the rural and the other for the urban area9.
2.10   Income distribution
The treatment of income and consumption distribution in our model is quite elaborate,
as it should be. However, it needs to be stressed that there is hardly any degree of
freedom in modeling the distribution of income in India. The mechanics of the incomedistribution is strictly guided by the type of data available. A detailed account of the
9 The parametric values of the rural-urban split ratios are obtained from Pradhan  et al (2000), and add up
to one  for each of the six sources of income.
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income distribution module is provided in Narayana, Parikh and Srinivasan (1991)
and Mitra (1994). Here we outline the main steps. (In what follows the account is the
same for the rural and urban areas, and so we shall not make a distinction between thetwo).
Step 1 - We start with the factoral incomes and map them onto incomes accruing to 15
income classes10 using a constant share income allocation scheme (obtained fromsecondary data sources of the Indian economy  see Appendix 3) for all the 6 types of
income  self-employment income, wage income, capital income, incomes from land
and fixed factors and transfer payments by government and rest of the world11. Given
Yh , the income accruing to class h, and qh , the share of households in class h in thetotal population (also known from data sources), we compute the mean and variance
of income .
It may be noted here that, in case of across-the-board transfers of revenues earned
from carbon taxes or sale of emission permits, these revenues are distributed acrossthe 15 income classes according to the same constant share income allocation scheme
applicable to the transfer payments above. To put it another way, in the across-the-
board transfers case, the carbon tax or permit revenues are simply treated like additonal
government transfers, and, hence, distributed across the 15 income classes inproportions same as those for routine government transfers.
On the other hand, in case of the targeted transfers, the carbon tax or the permit
revenues are distributed exclusively and equally to the lowest four income deciles.
That is to say, each of the lowest four income classes (deciles) receive 25% of therevenues earned from carbon taxes or sale of permits, while the remaining 11 income
groups or classes get nothing.
Finally, it must be stressed that, the lowest four income deciles or the poorest 40% of
the population are conceptually and quantitatively different from what we call the povertyratio (defined below in Step3). While the former specifies the relative income position
of a section of the population, the latter is the share of population at or below a pre-
defined minimum level of consumption necessary for sustenance. The relative income
inequality in most economies change slowly, but that does not mean that poverty cannotbe eradicated fast. The relative income position of the poor might remain unchanged,
but their consumption reach can be extended beyond the minimum sustenance level.
Hence, poverty ratio can decline rapidly even when relative income inequality is stable.
That said, it must be recognized that, in another sense which is important in this modelingexercise, there is an overlap between the two concepts. That is, if there is poverty in
an economy, in the sense of absolute deprivation of basic minimum consumption, it
obviously exists in the lower rungs of the income ladder. From the poverty removal
10 The 15 income classes are percentiles taken in tens, fives and ones. The first nine income classes are,
from bottom to top, nine deciles, followed by the 10 th  class which is more than
90th percentile and upto 95th percentile, and, finally, we have the top five income classes
 i.e., the 96th, 97th, 98th, 99th and 100th percentile.
11 The constant shares  i.e., the exogenously given split ratios - for each income-type add up across the 15
income  classes to one.
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policy point of view, therefore, it is the lowest four or three or two income deciles thathave to be targeted.
Step 2 - We first make the assumption that the distribution of population according to
per capita income and per capita consumption expenditure is bivariate log-normal.
(a) Since the distribution of income and consumption expenditure is assumed to be
bivariate log-normal, the mean and variance of the logarithm of per capita incomeis computed from the mean and variance of income of Step 1.
(b) The bivariate lognormality assumption implies that log income and log consumption
expenditure are linearly related, so the mean and variance of log per capita
consumption expenditure can be easily calculated.
Step 3  Given the mean and standard deviation of log income and log consumption
expenditure, we derive the distributions of population, consumption and total income
by 5 consumption classes. (The upper boundaries of the 5 consumption classes  cel1,cel2, cel3, cel4, cel5  are taken from the consumption expenditure data published by theNSSO (National Sample Survey Organization)-45th Round). More specifically, we
find the shares of (i) population (ii) consumption and (iii) total income accruing to the
households that fall under expenditure level celk , for k = 1,2,,5, using the standardizedcumulative normal distribution. The poverty ratio is the share of population with per
capita consumption expenditure less than or equal to cel5 .
Step 4 - From the cumulative shares of the five consumption expenditure classes we
arrive at the per capita expenditure and income for each of these classes by simplytaking the difference between the cumulative shares of the class in question and the
preceding class.
Step 5  Once we have the per capita consumption expenditure for each of the 5consumption classes, we use the Stone-Geary linear expenditure system to determine
separately the sectoral per capita consumption demands for each of these classes.
Step 6   The sectoral per capita consumption demands for each class are then
multiplied by the class-specific population, and the resulting product aggregated, first,over the five classes and, then over, the two regions to arrive at the commoditywise
consumption demands.
2.11   Savings
Total household savings in the economy is an aggregate of the savings of the 10 urbanand rural consumption expenditure classes. For each of the five rural and five urban
classes, household savings is determined residually from their respective budget
constraints, which state that household income is either allocated to household
consumption or to household savings. Government savings is obtained as sum of thetax and tariff revenues, less the value of its consumption and transfers. Government
revenue originates from the following five sources: taxes on domestic intermediates,
tariffs on imported intermediates, taxes on consumption and investment, taxes on final
imports and income taxes - i.e., taxes on wage, self-employed and capital (profit)incomes. All taxes (excluding carbon tax) are of the proportional and ad valorem type,
14 SANDEE Working Paper No. 12-05
and all the tax rates are exogenously given. Government expenditure takes place onaccount of government consumption and transfers to households, both of which are
exogenously fixed. The CO2 emission taxes are recycled to the households via thegovernment, which means that they be included in (or excluded from) both the revenue
and the expenditure of the government budget. Foreign savings in the model is expressedas the excess of payments for intermediate and final imports over the sum of exports
earnings, net current transfers and net factor income from abroad The latter two, it
may be noted, are exogenously given values in the model.
2.12   Market equilibrium and macroeconomic closure
Market clearing equilibrium in the commodity markets is ensured by the condition that
sectoral supply of composite commodity must equal demand faced by that sector. In
the production structure of the model the domestic gross output of a sector is defined
to be a combination of domestic sales and exports, based on a CET transformationfunction. In turn, the domestic sales part of the sectoral gross output and the final
imports of that sector are aggregated through an Armington-type CES function to arrive
at the sectoral composite commodity supply12. On the other hand, the demand for the
composite commodity consists of intermediate demand, final demand - which in turn isan aggregation of consumption, investment and government demands - and change in
stocks.
The model is Walrasian in spirit with the sectoral prices being the equilibrating variables
for the market-clearing equations. The Walras law holds and the model is, therefore,homogeneous of degree zero in prices determining only relative prices. The price index
 defined to be a weighted average of the sectoral prices  serves as the numeraire,
and is, therefore, fixed at one.
Finally, note that although the model is neoclassical in nature, it follows investment-driven macro closure in which aggregate investment is fixed and the components of
savings - household savings, government savings and foreign savings - are endogenous
variables and adjust to equalize saving and investment.
2.13 Dynamics
The model is multiperiod in nature, where the unit of period is one year. However, it isnot an an  inter-temporal dynamic optimization model; it is only recursively dynamic.That is, it is solved as a sequence of static single-year CGE models, where investmentin the current year enhances the available capital stock and depreciation depletes thatstock, resulting in net additions (reductions) to sectoral capital stocks between twoperiods. Likewise, the sectoral allocation ratios for private investment are revised fromperiod to period on the basis of sectoral relative rates of return on capital. Hence,prior to solving the CGE model for any given year  other than the base-year  aninterim-period-sub-model (eqs. 101 to 103) is worked out to update the sectoral capitalstocks and the sectoral allocation shares of private investment.
12 Note that in the nesting structure diagram given above (fig. 1), these 2 functions are not shown. The
nesting diagram starts with the sectoral gross output at the top, and goes down the vertical linkages of
inputs.
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3. The Business-as-Usual Scenario
Our CGE model has been calibrated to the benchmark equilibrium data set of theIndian economy for the year 1989-90. The basic data set of the Indian economy forthe year 1989-90 has been obtained from the Central Statistical Organization - NationalAccounts Statistics of India (various issues) and the CSO (1997) - Input-OutputTransactions Table - 1989-90. Other parameters and initial values of different variableshave been estimated from the data available in various other published sources.
Given the benchmark data set for all the variables and the elasticity parameters, theshift and share parameters are calibrated in such a manner that if we solve the modelusing the base-year data inputs, the result will be the input data itself (Shoven andWhalley, 1992).
Finally, using a time series of the exogenous variables of the model, we generate asequence of equilibria for the period 1990-2020. From the sequence of equilibria,with 5-year time intervals13, the growth paths of selected (macro) variables of theeconomy are outlined to describe the BAU scenario.
3.1  The macro variables
In the BAU scenario, real GDP growth throughout the period 1990-2020 varies in therange 4%-6%. The GDP growth rate, which is 5.7% per year during 1990-95, slowsdown to less than 5% in the period 1995-2005 (table 6). After that the growth ratepicks up again to more than 5% per year till 2020 (figure 2). The driving force of GDPgrowth in our model comes from growth in the two main exogenous variables - investmentand labour supply. In fact, the directional changes and the turning points in thequinquennial GDP growth rates seems to be governed by the exogenously giveninvestment growth rates over the thirty year period. Investment adds to the capitalstock, inducing a substitution away from labour into capital. This results in an increasein labour productivity, measured as GDP per unit of labour (figure 3). Growth in labourproductivity coupled with the simultaneous growth in labour supply is what providesthe main impetus to GDP growth.
3.2   Poverty ratio
The poverty ratio in the BAU scenario declines from 37.5% in 1990 to 2% in 2020(table 15). However, the noteworthy fact is that the decline in poverty ratio is verymuch linked to the growth in GDP. That is to say, with the GDP growing faster after2005, the decline in poverty also speeds up. In the first 15-year period, 1990-2005,the poverty ratio declines quinquennially by about 4-5 percentage points; in the later 15-year period 2005-2020 it declines quinquennially by about 7-8 percentage points.
13 Since Indian database is on an annual basis, we solved the model annually for thirty years. However, the
results are reported for five-year intervals. This is because, results presented on a year-to-year basis for
thirty years, would not be amenable to any meaningful analysis.
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3.3   Energy use
Total energy use increases by about 320% over the 30-year period 1990-2020.However, the annual growth rate of energy use along with the annual growth rate ofGDP declines each quinquennium until 2005, with the decline being sharper in case ofthe former after 2005 (table 7). Increased employment of capital in the productionprocess as well as modest autonomous energy efficiency improvement results in aneconomy of the energy inputs in the production process as reflected in the decliningenergy use per unit of GDP.
3.4   Carbon emissions
Total carbon emissions in the period 1990-2020 rise from 168 million tonnes to 559million tonnes at an average rate of 4.1% per year (table 6). However, the growth rateis not uniform. It drops from more than 4% in the pre-2005 period to less than 4% inthe post 2005 period. This is largely explained by the decline in the energy-GDP ratioafter 2005 (table 7). In the Indian economy carbon is emitted predominantly - as muchas 72% of the total emissions - from the combustion of coal. The share of coal in thetotal emissions remains unchanged throughout the period (table 10).
In assessing Indias contribution to global carbon emissions, it is important to look atthe per capita carbon emissions14. Indias per capita emissions in 1990 turn out to be0.21 tonnes. It increases quite rapidly over the 30-year period and goes up to 0.69tonnes by the year 2020 (table 12). Even this level of per capita emissions is considerablyless than the global per capita emissions which are approximately 1 tonne per year.
4.  Policy Simulations
We develop eight alternative policy scenarios for two basic policy instruments for carbon
emission reduction - domestic carbon tax and internationally tradable permits based
on equal per capita emissions allocation.
For the carbon tax policy we have four policy scenarios - simulations 1, 1(TT), 2 and 2(TT). Policysimulations 1 and 2 deal respectively with the two cases of fixing the carbon emission at the 1990 levelall through the 30-year period, and of 10% annual reduction in emissions, with 2 variants in each - onein which the carbon tax revenues are recycled to the households like additional government transfers,i.e., the across-the-board transfers case, and the other in which the tax revenues are exclusively transferredto a target group comprising of the four lowest income deciles - i.e., the targeted transfers case.
For internationally tradable permits, we have again four policy scenarios - simulations 3, 3(TT), 4and 4(TT) - representing the same 2 variants, with the difference that instead of carbon tax revenues,we have, in this case, revenues earned from the sale of permits. For the policy scenarios 3 and3(TT), the emissions quota is fixed at 1 tonne per capita14 based on 1990 population as suggestedby Parikh and Parikh (1998), who have argued that this would ensure equity between developedand developing countries and simultaneously discourage the latter from increasing their population.
14 Note that the per capita emissions have been calculated on the basis of the 1990 population for all the
years, so that a higher population in the years subsequent to 1990 is not allowed to undermine the total
emissions in the economy.
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The permit price for the simulations 3 and 3 (TT) is exogenously given to be US$ 6 per tonne ofcarbon emission, which is Rs 100 per tonne at the 1989-90 exchange rate of Rs 16.60 perdollar. In reality, the permit price will emerge from a global trading system of permits,which, for example, has been modeled by Edmonds et al (1993) in the SGM. However,ours is a country-specific exercise focusing on how it stands to gain or lose from aninternationally tradable regime of permits. We, therefore, take the world market priceof permits as given, but do consider alternative permit prices in different policysimulations. Hence, the policy simulations 4 and 4(TT) are simply repeat exercises ofsimulations 3 and 3(TT) respectively, with the permit price exogenously fixed at Rs200 per tonne.
The eight policy simulations are summarized in table 3 given below.
Table  3  :  The policy simulations
Policy Instrument Carbon
Emission
Restriction
Reveues from Carbon 
Tax/ Internationally 
Tradable Permits
Policy Simulation 1 Domestic Carbon 
Taxes 
Fixed at 1990 
level 
Recycled to the households 
like additional government 
transfers 
Policy Simulation 1 (TT) 
[TT : Targeted Transfers] 
 
Domestic Carbon 
Taxes 
Fixed at 1990 
level 
Recycled exclusively to a 
target group of households 
comprising of the four 
lowest income deciles 
Policy Simulation 2 Domestic Carbon 
Taxes 
10 % annual 
reduction 
Recycled to the households 
like additional government 
transfers 
Policy Simulation 2 (TT) 
[TT : Targeted Transfers] 
 
Domestic Carbon 
Taxes 
10 % annual 
reduction 
Recycled exclusively to a 
target group of households 
comprising of the four 
lowest income deciles 
Policy Simulation 3 Internationally 
Tradable Permits 
[Permit Price= 
$6 / tonne, i.e., Rs 
100 /tonne] 
1 tonne of 
carbon per capita 
based on the 
1990 population 
Recycled to the households 
like additional government 
transfers 
Policy Simulation 3 (TT) 
[TT : Targeted Transfers] 
Internationally 
Tradable Permits 
[Permit Price= 
$6 / tonne,  i.e., Rs 
100 / tonne] 
1 tonne of 
carbon per capita 
based on the 
1990 population 
Recycled exclusively to a 
target group of households 
comprising of the four 
lowest income deciles 
Policy Simulation 4 Internationally 
Tradable Permits 
[Permit Price = 
$12 /tonne, i.e., Rs 
200/tonne] 
1 tonne of 
carbon per capita 
based on the 
1990 population 
Recycled to the households 
like additional government 
transfers 
Policy Simulation 4 (TT) 
[TT : Targeted Transfers] 
Internationally 
Tradable Permits 
[Permit Price = 
$12/tonne, i.e., Rs 
200/tonne] 
 
1 tonne of 
carbon per capita 
based on the 
1990 population 
Recycled exclusively to a 
target group of households 
comprising of the four 
lowest income deciles 
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It would be useful to bear in mind how the economy would adjust to the introduction
of domestic carbon taxes (policy simulations 1, 1(TT), 2 and 2(TT)) and internationallytradable permits (policy simulations 3, 3(TT), 4 and 4(TT)) before going into a detailed
discussion of the eight policy scenarios.
A carbon tax results in price increases for each of the fossil fuels  coal, refined oiland natural gas. The extent of price increase in case of each of these fuels is determinedby the carbon content of the respective fuels. The price increase is largest for coal
because coal has the highest carbon content, and smallest for natural gas which hasthe lowest carbon content. Producers respond by switching from coal towards refinedoil and natural gas as a source of energy. At the same time, higher energy prices force
a reduction in overall energy use. Carbon emissions are reduced on account of bothfuel switching and overall reduction in fuel use. Usually (inter-fossil-fuel substitutionselasticities being low), the fuel reducing effect dominates over the fuel switching effect,
resulting in a retardation of GDP growth. Typically, the adverse effect of reduced energyuse on GDP growth diminishes over time as energy efficiency improvement coupledwith a higher capital intensity in the production process results in a declining energy
use per unit of GDP. Typically also, the slowdown in consumption growth is moresevere than that in case of GDP growth. When production activity goes down, labourdemand and wages decline leading to a fall in personal incomes (unless the addition to
personal income from the recycled carbon tax revenue is large enough to offset thisfall). Moreover, higher energy prices end up as higher prices for consumer goods, thus
lowering real consumption.
With the introduction of internationally tradable permits with equal per capita emissions,
India will most likely turn out to be a net seller of permits. A carbon emission quota of1 tonne per capita based on the 1990 population of 810 million effectively means anupper limit of 810 million tonnes of total carbon emissions for the Indian economy.
Looking at the carbon emissions in the BAU scenario (table 9), it is easy to see thatIndia will be a net seller of tradable permits for the next two or three decades. That is,countries with high per capita emissions would purchase permits from countries with
low per capita emissions, such as India. That would in effect imply a transfer of wealthinto India.16 The total revenue from the sale of permits in the international market forpermits is recycled to the households as transfer payments from rest of the world.
These transfer payments are akin to an autonomous increase in consumption demand(like an increase in government expenditure), and, therefore, result in a higher demand-driven GDP growth. Higher incomes boost consumption further, so that consumption
rises faster than GDP. However, over time as the economy gets close to the upper limitof 810 million tonnes of total carbon emissions, the revenue earned from the sale ofpermits will shrink, and the GDP gains will become progressively smaller. In fact, in
not so distant a future, the economy will turn around from being a net seller of permits
to a net buyer of permits.
It may be mentioned that, for our policy scenarios concerned with Indias participation
in a regime of internationally tradable permits with equal per capita emissions, we are
16 A net buyer of permits would amount to a transfer of wealth out of India, but that eventuality does not
arise till 2020 in our scenarios  3, 3 (TT), 4 and 4(TT).
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assuming that the emission permit payments take place through the government, and
the latter decides to recycle these to the consumers, rather than producers. Till India isa low per capita emissions country (i.e., till its per capita emissions remain below 1tonne, the world average) it need not give priority to curbing emissions, but to income
distribution and poverty etc.  Subsequently, it can switch priorities. That is our view, and ourpolicy scenarios 3, 3(TT), 4, 4(TT) emanate from this view.17
We now turn to an appraisal the policy scenarios. A summary of the key results of the policysimulations are presented in the tables 4 and 5 (Appendix 1). In these tables, selectedvariables  GDP, consumption, aggregate carbon emissions, per capita carbon emissions,
poverty ratio and the absolute number of poor  of the various policy scenarios are comparedwith those of the BAU scenario. Needless to say, henceforth, all comparisons for all the policysimulations have been made with respect to the BAU scenario.
4.1  Policy simulations 1 and 1(TT)
In this simulation the procedure followed is to fix the carbon emission level at the 1990 level andto endogenize the carbon tax rate (which was fixed at zero in the BAU scenario). The sequential
equilibrium solution of the model then generates, among other values, the appropriate carbon taxrates for each of the years subsequent to 1990. The tax rates rise from Rs 417 per tonne in 1995to Rs 2765 per tonne in 2020. The growth rate of the carbon tax rate is lower 2005 onwards,
because of the lower energy consumption growth rates in this period (table 8). Carbon taxesraise the price of the fossil fuels differentially  the increase in price is maximum for coal whichhas the highest carbon content, followed by that of refined oil and natural gas (table 9)  and thus
induce fuel switching. The share of coal in total emissions, which was almost 73% throughout theperiod in the BAU scenario, declines considerably, particularly after 2005. There are correspondingincreases in the share of refined oil. The share of natural gas increases only marginally (table 10).
The aggregate emission levels fall relative to the BAU scenario by 19% in 1995 and by 70% in2020. Cumulative emissions in the 30-year period fall by 50% (table 11). Per capita carbon
emissions, based on the 1990 population, also fall drastically. In 2020, it is down to 0.21 tonneper capita while it was 0.69 tonnes per capita in the BAU scenario (table 12).
The energy use and GDP trends of simulation 1 suggest that upto 2000, the fuel-reducing effectdominates, and subsequently fuel-saving becomes more important in determining the impact onGDP18. Upto 2000, the decline in GDP is more than that in the use of energy inputs. However,
from 2005 to 2020, energy use declines much faster than GDP. After 2005, the energy-GDPratio in simulation 1 is significantly lower than that in the BAU scenario (table 7).
17 Some analysts would want the emission permit revenues to be recycled to producers, who would then
invest them in new technology with lower carbon emissions. That would be another policy scenario
which we have not done in this study. However, it can be done in this model with some changes.
18 When carbon taxes are imposed , fuel inputs become costly. So, the immediate impact is a reduction in the
use of fuels leading to a large decline in output. As a consequence, energy-output ratio goes up. This is
known as fuel-reducing effect. However, over time the economy adjusts by indulging in more efficient
use of fuels. This results in a decline in the energy-output ratio. This is known as the fuel-saving effect.
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Losses in consumption are higher than losses in GDP even though the carbon tax
revenues are recycled to the consumers (table 14). This is because the reduced economic
activity (reflected in a lower GDP) results in a decrease in the demand for labour and
wages causing disposable personal incomes to fall. Moreover, higher energy prices
are passed on to consumers through higher consumer goods prices which in turn lower
real consumption. The addition to household incomes from the recycled carbon tax
revenues are not sufficient to compensate for the fall in their incomes.
The poverty ratio, i.e., the percentage of poor below the poverty line, in simulation 1
increases drastically and progressively from 1995 to 2020. In the BAU scenario, the
poverty ratio is 32% in 1995, but declines to 2% in 2020. In simulation 1, the poverty
ratio is 34% in 1995 and declines to only 8% in 2020 (table 15). In other words, the
number of poor in 2020 in scenario 1 is 4 times the number of poor found in the BAU
scenario during the same year (table 16).
In the targeted transfers case of scenario 1 (TT)19, the poverty ratio improves a little vis-
à-vis the across-the-board transfers case of scenario 1. However, in relation to the
BAU scenario, it is progressively higher from 1995 to 2020 (table 15). Moreover, the
number of poor in the year 2020 under scenario 1(TT) is almost 3.4 times that in the
BAU scenario in the same year (table 16).
4.2  Policy simulations 2 and 2(TT)
Policy simulation 2, on the whole, is a milder version of policy simulation 1. In simulation
1, the average annual reduction in carbon emission works out to be 50%, while, in
simulation 2, the annual reduction in carbon emissions is fixed to be only 10% (table
11). Per capita emissions, fall progressively from 1990 to 2020. As compared to the
BAU scenario, they are 0.02 tonnes less in 1990 and 0.07 tonnes less in  2020 (table
12).
Expectedly, the carbon tax rates in simulation 2 are of much lower orders of magnitude.
The carbon tax rate is Rs.218 per tonne in 1990, rises a little in 1995, and, thereafter,
declines gradually to Rs.174 per tonne, because of lower energy consumption growth
rates in the latter period (table 8). Energy prices also increase moderately (table 9).
GDP and consumption losses in scenario 2, as compared to the BAU scenario, are of
much lower orders of magnitude than those in scenario 1 (tables 13 and 14). However,
consumption losses are more than GDP losses as in scenario 1. In scenario 2, GDP
losses vary from 0.75% to 1.20%, while consumption losses vary from 1.20% to
1.55%.
19  Note that for simulation 1(TT), and likewise for all other TT versions of the remaining 3 simulations, the
results are discussed for poverty ratio and the number of poor only. This is because the figures for the
macro variables in case of the targeted transfers versions of the simulations do not differ much from
those in their respective across-the-board transfers versions.
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The poverty ratio in scenario 2 increases only marginally with respect to the BAU
scenario. It increases by 1.34 percentage points in 1990, and by only 0.1 percentage
point in 2020 (tables 4 and 5). However, the real adverse impact of simulation 2 on
poverty comes out in terms of the number of poor. The number of poor in simulation 2,
relative to the BAU scenario, increases by 3.58% in 1990 and 4.89% in 2020 (tables
4 and 5).
Under targeted transfers of simulation 2(TT), the poverty scenario is much less adverse
than under simulation 2. Poverty ratio, as compared to that of the BAU scenario,
increases by 0.56 percentage point in 1990, and by only 0.02 percentage point in year
2020 (tables 4 an 5). The number of poor in simulation 2(TT), compared to that in the
BAU scenario, increases by 1.49% in 1990, and by only 0.92% in 2020 (tables 4 and
5). The results of this simulation clearly show that the costs to GDP and poverty
reduction imposed by a carbon tax can be reduced to a great extent by moderating the
carbon emission reduction target and at the same time recycling the carbon tax revenues
to those living below the poverty line.
4.3   Policy simulations 3 and 3(TT)
In policy simulation 3, the carbon emission quota is fixed at 1 tonne per capita based
on the 1990 population of 810 million. In other words, the maximum permitted total
emission of carbon is fixed at 810 milllion tonnes annually for the Indian economy. For
every tonne of carbon emitted less than the permitted 810 million tonnes, the Indian
economy earns $6, which is Rs100 at the base-year exchange rate, through the sale of
a permit in a global market of permits, and the total revenue form the sale of permits is
recycled to the households as transfers from the rest of the world.
The exact procedure followed in this simulation is to fix an upper bound for total
emissions - i.e., 810 million tonnes for each year. The actual total emission of carbon
turns out to be much less than the upper bound for each period (The upper bound is
not binding in any of the years). The difference between the permitted emissions and
the actual emissions is then multiplied by the permit price to arrive at the total revenue
from the sale of permits, which is then recycled to the households like additional transfer
payments from the rest of the world. In the process, the model generates a set of
equilibrium values for GDP, consumption, poverty ratio etc.
In simulation 3 the carbon emissions increase relative to the BAU scenario. The increase
in emissions is almost 14% in the year 1990, but, in the later years, declines to be in
the range of 5.50-9.00% (table 11). Per capita emissions also increase throughout the
period, with the increases being in the range of 0.02-0.04 tonnes (table 12). However,
what needs to be noted is that, even in the last year, 2020, per capita emissions are
only 0.73 tonnes, which is less than the world average of 1 tonne per capita.
The infusion of additional transfer payments from the rest of the world, in the form of
permit revenue, leads to substantial increases in GDP and consumption in this simulation.
GDP increases by 6.7% in the year 1990. However, in the later years, GDP increases
are progressively smaller. In the final year, 2020, GDP increases by only 1.8%. The
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consumption gains are higher than the GDP gains in each of the periods (tables 13 and
14). Apart from the increases in consumption resulting from the increased transfers to
households, there are second-round increases in consumption when there is additional
income generated from the demand-induced increase in production activities.
The poverty ratio declines significantly in scenario 3. It declines by 2.43 percentage
points in the year 1990, and by 0.38 percentage points in the year 2020 (tables 4 an
5). The number of poor, relative to the BAU scenario, decreases by 6.5% in 1990,
and by 18.8% in the year 2020. That is, in the final year, 2020, the number of poor is
only 21.24 million in this simulation, as compared to 26.15 million in the BAU scenario
(table 5).
Poverty declines even faster under the targeted transfers version of simulation 3. The
number of poor in this scenario, compared to the BAU scenario, declines by 11% in
1990 and by 50% in 2020. By the year 2020, the number of poor in this simulation is
only 13.18 million, i.e., half of the number of poor in the BAU scenario (table 5).
4.4   Policy simulations 4 and 4(TT)
Simulation 4 is worked out exactly like the simulation 3, with the difference that, in the
former, the permit price is given to be $12 per tonne of carbon emitted.
The increase in carbon emissions in this simulation, relative to the BAU scenario, is as
high as 19% in 1990. However, emissions decline progressively over the 30-year period.
By the end of the period, in the year 2020, the increase in emissions, compared to the
BAU scenario, is around 6% (table 11). The increases in the per capita emissions in
the various years are in the range of 0.03-0.04 tonnes. In the last year, 2020, per
capita emissions in this scenario are 0.73 tonnes, as against 0.69 tonnes of the BAU
scenario (table 12).
GDP gains in this simulation are expectedly larger than that in simulation 3. GDP, as
compared to the BAU scenario, increases by about 12% in 1990, and by almost 2% in
2020. Consumption gains are even bigger. Consumption increases by more than 12%
in 1990, and by more than 3% in 2020 (tables 4 and 5) .
There is a very substantial decline in the poverty ratio in simulation 4. Poverty ratio is
only 30.02% in 1990, as compared to 37.45% in the BAU scenario in that year. In
2020, poverty ratio is 0.87%, as compared to 2.01% of the BAU scenario. The number
of poor in 2020 declines by 57% and is only 11.28 million, as against 26.15 million of
the BAU scenario (tables 4 and 5).
In simulation 4(TT), there is an even speedier decline of poverty. Poverty ratio is
25.45% in 1990, and only 0.08% in 2020. The number of people in poverty, relative
to the BAU scenario, decreases by 32% in 1990 and by 96% in 2020. In that year, the
number of poor in scenario 4(TT) is only 1.02 million as against 26.15 million of the
BAU scenario (tables 4 and 5).
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4.5   Policy simulations : caveats
In the interpretation of the simulation results, the limitations of our model must be
borne in mind. One limitation of our model is that in the production of electricity, the
input substitution possibilities are confined to be only within the fossil fuels  coal,
refined oil and natural gas. Carbon free options such as hydro, wind, solar and nuclear
electricity are not considered in the model. The contributions of these energy sources
in the total energy consumption in India are not likely to increase significantly within
the time frame of our model, 1990-2020. As can be seen from table 1, the contribution
of other energy sources which include wind, solar and nuclear energy, to total energy
consumption in India in 1990 is only 0.6 %. Hydropower provides 6.21% of the total
energy consumed in 1990. But its percentage share does not seem to grow over time.
It was 5.24% in 1970, increased to 6.77% in 1980, but starts declining after that till it
reaches 6.21% in 1990. Even, the post-economic reforms period of 1991-92 to 1997-
98, Sengupta and Gupta (2003) find a declining share of hydro power and an increasing
share of thermal power in the total gross generation of electricity. They conclude that
there has been no success in raising the share of carbon free options of hydro and
nuclear in gross power generation by the introduction of reforms. Bearing in mind the
limited relevance of the carbon free options in the next two or three decades in India,
we have kept our model structure simplified and avoided the unnecessary complication
of introducing the options of hydro, wind and nuclear in the generation of power. That
said, we do recognize that the model, in its present form is incomplete if it has to be
implemented over a longer time horizon of fifty years or more, and should be extended
for further study. The absence of clean energy options such as hydro electricity, means
that the the adverse effects of emission restriction on economic growth and poverty
reduction shown in simulations 1 and 1(TT) are somewhat exaggerated. However,
even with hydro electricity they would remain large, given the high orders of magnitude
of losses in GDP and poverty alleviation in this simulation. In case of policy simulations
2 and 2(TT), with a softer carbon emission reduction target, the relatively small losses
in GDP and poverty alleviation could not possibly be compensated by introducing the
hydropower option, except, perhaps in the last few years of the thirty year period.
Another more serious limitation of the model in its present form is the fact that it is
recursively dynamic and, not fully dynamic. We regard this as a more serious limitation
because it restricts the scope of policy analysis that can be carried out within the
framework of the model. A recursively dynamic model basically generates a sequence
of static equilibria and is, therefore, suitable for analyzing the consequences for GDP
and poverty of annual emission reduction targets. However, an equally viable policy
option is a dynamically optimum strategy with cumulative emission reduction targets.
This, in fact, can be less costly in terms of GDP loss and poverty reduction foregone
because it allows the economy to define an inter-temporal adjustment path. But such a
strategy cannot be examined through a  recursively dynamic model. It needs an inter-
temporal optimizing framework like the one used in Murthy, Panda and Parikh (2000).
Our only justification for using a quasi-dynamic instead of a fully dynamic model is the
the economy of effort necessitated by the time constraint specified for this study. We
hope to overcome this limitation in a later version of the model.
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Finally, it would be useful to see how the main results of our study based on a recursively
dynamic CGE model compare with the results obtained in other studies using a different
model structure  i.e., an inter-temporal model in an activity analysis framework. Two
recent studies in India which have used this modelling framework are Murthy, Panda
and Parikh (2000) and Gupta (2004). Murthy, Panda and Parikh (2000) do not consider
a carbon tax scenario, but their tradable permits with equal per capita emissions
allocation scenario is comparable to our policy simulations 3 and 4. In Murthy, Panda
and Parikh (2000), GDP in the the 30th year (i.e., year 2020) increases by 6.7% and
13.5% for given permit prices of $6/tonne and $12/tonne respectively. In our model,
GDP in the 30th year increases by only 1.8% and 2% respectively in scenarios 3 (permit
price equals to $6/tonne) and 4 (permit price equals to $12/tonne). In our view, a
model based solely on material balances with prices not playing any role, overestimates
the GDP gains from additonal international transfers through the sale of emission permits.
In Gupta (2004), under what he calls the Trade and Environmental Policy Scenario-1,
total emission is reduced to 94.8% of the 1990 level at the end of the year 2019-20,
using a command-and-control measure. In order to meet this emissions target, CO2emissions in 2019-20 have to be reduced by 89.3% as compared to the emissions
under the BAU scenario20. Such a reduction in total emissions entails a loss in GDP of
87% in the year 2019-20 relative to the BAU scenario. On the other hand, in our
study when total emissions are reduced by 70% to bring it down to the 1990 level in
the year 2020 under a carbon tax scenario (policy simulation 1), GDP falls by only
4.61% compared to the BAU scenario. Once again the loss in GDP seems to be over-
estimated in case of the activity analysis based model. This prompts us to reiterate our
view that a price driven CGE model is more likely to generate realistic estimates of
GDP gains or losses arising from the various emissions policies.
5.   Conclusions and Policy Implications
We conclude by highlighting the main policy lessons from our simulation exercises. The
policy lessons that emanate from our policy scenarios are fairly clear. They are, however,
in two parts.
In the first part, i.e., in policy scenarios 1 and 2, the lessons learnt are about the
efficacy of a domestic carbon tax policy to reduce carbon emissions without seriously
compromising the growth and poverty reduction goals of the Indian economy. In this
regard, the results of the policy scenario 1 are very discouraging. That is to say, the
employment of a carbon tax to restrict the carbon emissions in the Indian economy to
the 1990 level, imposes heavy costs in terms of lower GDP and higher poverty. With
targeted transfers to the poor, the costs in terms of higher poverty are somewhat
mitigated, but they remain quite high - i.e., the number of poor in 2020 increases by
3.4 times. It needs to be stressed that, these high costs in terms of GDP losses and
poverty reduction foregone in this policy scenario cannot be significantly reduced by
including the contribution of clean energy options, such as hydro electricity. Hydropower
constitutes a very small and stagnant share (5%-6%) of the total energy consumed in
20 The base-year of the model in Gupta (2004)  is 1993-94.
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India. The share of other clean energy sources (nuclear, wind and solar) is even smaller
 less than 1 percent. More importantly, the costs to GDP and poverty alleviation in
this policy scenario are not unexpectedly high. In fact, such high costs are a natural
consequence of an unduly restrictive carbon emissions policy. The latter is obvious
from the fact that, the per capita emissions (based on the 1990 population) in this
simulation in 2020 are 0.21 tonnes as compared to 0.69 tonnes in the BAU scenario in
the same year.
In policy scenario 2, a milder restriction of 10% annual reduction in carbon emission is
achieved through the imposition of a carbon tax. The GDP losses are still significant,
though not very large. But, poverty, relative to the BAU scenario, is higher throughout
the 30-year period. However, this can be changed with targeted recycling of revenues
to the poorest households in the economy. With targeted transfers the number of people
in poverty increases by about 4-5 million in the first half of the period, 1990-2005,
and, subsequently, by less than 2 million in the second half of the 30-year period,
2005-2020. In fact, at the end of the period in year 2020, the number of people in
poverty is only 0.24 million more than that in the business-as-usual scenario. This
result suggests that targeted transfers is a contrivance that can be effectively used to
dodge the trade-off between poverty reduction and carbon emissions, provided the
emission reduction target is a modest one, such as a 10% annual reduction in total
emissions. A 10% annual reduction in total emissions implies that per capita emissions
(based on 1990 population) in 2020 will be 0.62 tonnes. This is no mean target for per
capita emissions given that the average world per capita emissions in 1990 is 1 tonne.
In the second part, i.e., in policy scenarios 3 and 4, the implications of Indias
participation in a global trading system of emission permits are analyzed. In these
scenarios, India is allowed a maximum emission of 180 million tonnes of carbon annually.
The actual annual emissions in these scenarios, however, are much less than the
maximum limit. In an internationally tradable permits regime, India stands to gain by
keeping its emissions as much less than the stipulated maximum as possible. In other
words, India does not have a perverse incentive to emit more in a tradable emission
permits regime, as is sometimes feared. Nor is it true that, India can perpetually induce
a resource flow from the developed countries through the sale of emission permits, by
virtue of having its per capita emissions at a level which are lower than the world
average per capita emissions of 1 tonne of carbon. On the contrary, with actual emissions
increasing faster in the policy scenarios 3 and 4 than in the business-as-usual scenario,
it is safe to expect that the turnaround for India- from being a net seller of permits to a
net buyer of permits - will come before 2050.
Be that as it may, India gains immensely in terms of higher GDP growth and lower
poverty in the tradable emission permits scenarios  In case of scenario 3, in which the
permit price is $6 per tonne, in the 30-year period, GDP increases on an average by
3.7% per year and the number of people in poverty in 2020 goes down by about 19%.
In the targeted transfers variant of this scenario, the number of people in poverty in
2020 is in fact halved. In case of scenario 4, in which the permit price is $12 per
tonne, GDP increases in the 30-year period, on an average by 5.7% per year, and the
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number of people in poverty in 2020 is reduced by 57%. Moreover, in case of the
targeted transfers version of this scenario, poverty in 2020 virtually vanishes.
It is obvious, that global emissions trade with equal per capita emission entitlements
opens up a unique opportunity for India and other developing countries, to sidestep
the trade-off between carbon emissions, economic growth and poverty reduction. On
its own, India is unlikely to take the hard decision of imposing a domestic carbon tax
to reduce carbon emissions, even though a carbon tax with targeted transfers for a
very modest reduction in carbon emissions is not necessarily detrimental to economic
growth and poverty alleviation.
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Appendix 1
Table 5 :   BAU Scenario and the Policy Simulations : Selected Variables in 2020
Table 4 :   BAU Scenario and the Policy Simulations : Selected Variables in 1990
GDP 
 (in billion 
Rupees) 
Cons. 
 (in billion 
Rupees) 
Carbon 
Emissions
(in million 
tonnes) 
Per Capita 
Emissions (in 
tonnes per 
capita) 
Poverty 
Ratio 
 
(in percent)
No. of 
Poor  
(in million)
BAU 
 Scenario 
4380.11 3211.25 168.00 0.21 37.45 303.35 
GDP 
(%age diff. 
from BAU)
Cons. (%age 
diff. from 
BAU) 
Carbon 
Emissions 
(%age diff. 
from BAU)
Per Capita 
Emissions  
(in tonnes 
per capita) 
Poverty 
Ratio 
(in percent)
No. of 
Poor  
(in million)
No. of 
Poor 
(%age diff. 
from BAU)
Sim 1  0.00  0.00    0.00 0.21 37.45 303.35 0.00 
Sim 1(TT)  0.00   0.00    0.00 0.21 37.45 303.35 0.00 
Sim 2  -0.76 -1.24 -10.00 0.19 38.79 314.20 3.58 
Sim 2(TT)   -0.63 -1.04 -10.00 0.19 38.01 307.88 1.49 
Sim 3  6.69   6.81 13.70 0.24 35.02 283.66 -6.49 
Sim 3(TT)  6.79   7.27 14.64 0.24 33.30 269.76 -11.07 
Sim 4  11.83 12.01 18.95 0.25 30.02 243.14 -19.85 
Sim 4(TT)  11.91 12.57 19.66 0.25 25.45 206.13 -32.05 
GDP  
(in billion 
Rupees) 
Cons.  
(in billion 
Rupees) 
Carbon 
Emissions 
(in million 
tonnes) 
Per Capita 
Emissions (in 
tonnes per 
capita) 
Poverty 
Ratio  
(in percent) 
No. of Poor 
(in million)
BAU  
Scenario
20130.18 14730.50 559.46 0.69 2.01 26.15  
GDP 
(%age diff. 
from BAU)
Cons. 
(%age diff. 
from BAU)
Carbon 
Emissions 
(%age diff. 
from BAU)
Per Capita 
Emissions (in 
tonnes per 
capita) 
Poverty 
Ratio (in 
percent) 
No. of Poor 
(in million)
No. of Poor 
(%age diff. 
from BAU) 
Sim 1 -4.61 -8.28 -69.97 0.21 8.05 104.65 300.19 
Sim 1(TT) -4.52 -8.04 -69.97 0.21 6.87   89.31 241.53 
Sim 2 -0.76 -1.20 -10.00 0.62 2.11   27.43  4.89 
Sim 2(TT) -0.88 -1.08 -10.00 0.62 2.03   26.39   0.92 
Sim 3 1.83 2.53 5.83 0.73 1.63   21.24 -18.78 
Sim 3(TT) 1.86 2.70 6.38 0.73 1.01   13.18 -49.60 
Sim 4 1.98 3.12 6.24 0.73 0.87    11.28 -56.86 
Sim 4(TT) 2.05 3.21 6.94 0.74 0.08      1.02 -96.10 
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Note : The growth rates for each of the quinquenniums are the annual growth rates
Note : E : Total energy use in 103 terajoules
E/GDP : Energy input per unit of GDP in 103 terajoules per billion rupees
The growth rates for each of the quinquenniums are the annual growth rates.
In billion Rupees In million 
tonnes 
GDP    Cons.  Inv. (exo.) Carbon 
Emissions 
GDP 
(Growth
Rate) 
Cons. 
(Growth
Rate) 
Inv. 
(Growth
Rate) 
Carbon Emissions  
(Growth Rate) 
1990 4380.11 3211.25 1539.41 168.00     
1995 5835.89 3927.65 2182.17 208.09 5.74 4.03 6.98 4.28 
2000 7489.40 4856.58 2944.81 257.74 4.99 4.25 5.99 4.28 
2005 9160.77 6201.46 3704.05 315.75 4.03 4.89 4.59 4.06 
2010 11865.33  8312.96 4947.21 383.74 5.17 5.87 5.79 3.90 
2015 15290.51 10939.08 6580.08 464.50 5.07 5.49 5.70 3.82 
2020 20130.18 14730.50 8729.03 559.46 5.50 5.95 5.65 3.72 
Table 6 :   Macro variables and carbon emissions of the BAU scenario
E E
(Growth 
Rate) 
E/GDP E/GDP  E GDP 
BAU 
Scenario 
BAU BAU  Sim. 1 Sim. 1 (%age 
diff. from BAU) 
Sim. 1 (%age 
diff. from BAU) 
1990 565.46 5.72 0.1291 0.1291  0.00   0.00 
1995 752.84 5.17 0.1290 0.1293  -1.39 -1.64 
2000 975.07 4.16 0.1302 0.1304  -3.83 -3.95 
2005 1200.72 3.04 0.1311 0.1304  -5.77 -5.25 
2010 1397.54 2.64 0.1178 0.1149  -6.16 -3.82 
2015 1594.84 2.40 0.1043 0.0980 -10.27 -4.46 
2020 1798.64 5.72 0.0894 0.0830 -11.35 -4.61 
Table 7 :   Energy use
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 
Rs. per tonne Tax. Rate. 
(Growth Rate)
Rs. per tonne Tax. Rate. 
(Growth Rate)
1990 0.00  217.65  
1995 417.36  234.36  1.48 
2000 828.64 13.72 221.44 -1.13 
2005 1261.96  8.41 211.66 -0.90 
2010 1724.20  6.24 202.31 -0.90 
2015 2203.25  4.90 191.15 -1.13 
2020 2765.57  4.55 173.87 -1.90 
Table 8 :   Carbon tax rates
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Simulation 1  Simulation 2 
Coal  Ref. Oil Nat Gas Coal  Ref. Oil Nat Gas 
1990 
 112.38 38.71 33.62 
1995 
 218.48 69.34   61.91 122.68 39.56 34.42 
2000 
 511.00 147.12 138.21 132.62 35.38 35.18 
2005 
 914.37 277.03 228.57 132.38 38.64 36.48 
2010 
 869.74 324.74 279.57 104.33 35.84 32.61 
2015 1026.08 370.91 320.66   93.43 30.84 27.76 
2020 1137.08 441.88 415.08   79.37 25.27 25.17 
Table 9 :   Energy Prices (percentage difference from BAU scenario)
BAU Scenario Simulation 1 
Coal Ref. Oil Nat Gas Coal Ref. Oil Nat Gas
1990 72.23 22.66 5.11 72.23 22.66 5.11 
1995 72.46 22.54 5.00 70.36 24.37 5.27 
2000 73.11 22.23 4.66 71.06 23.72 5.21 
2005 73.25 22.52 4.23 71.39 24.33 4.28 
2010 73.35 22.50 4.15 71.18 24.50 4.32 
2015 73.14 23.80 3.06 70.37 26.01 3.62 
2020 72.98 23.98 3.03 70.42 26.18 3.40 
Table 10 :   Carbon emissions (percentage share of fossil fuels)
In million 
tonnes 
Percentage difference from BAU Scenario 
BAU  
Scenario 
Sim. 1 Sim. 1 
(TT) 
Sim. 2 Sim. 2 
 (TT) 
Sim. 3 Sim. 3 
(TT) 
Sim. 4 Sim. 4 
 (TT) 
1990 168.00 -0.00 -0.00 -10.00 -10.00 13.70  14.64 18.95 19.66 
1995 208.09 -19.27 -19.27 -10.00 -10.00   8.90 8.26 13.34 14.10 
2000  257.74 -34.82 -34.82 -10.00 -10.00   8.27 8.97   8.66 9.36 
2005 315.75 -46.79 -46.79 -10.00 -10.00   5.51 5.12   6.15 5.97 
2010 383.74 -56.22 -56.22 -10.00 -10.00   6.64 7.59   7.55 6.89 
2015 464.50 -63.83 -63.83 -10.00 -10.00   7.29 8.28   7.75 8.73 
2020 559.46 -69.97 -69.97 -10.00 -10.00   5.83 6.38   6.24 6.94 
-50.11 -50.11 -10.00 -10.00  7.30 7.82 8.54 8.96 
Table 11 :   Carbon Emissions
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In tonnes per capita 
BAU 
Scenario 
Sim. 1 Sim. 1
(TT) 
Sim. 2 Sim. 2 
(TT) 
Sim. 3 Sim. 3 
 (TT) 
Sim. 4 Sim. 4 
 (TT) 
1990 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 
1995 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 
2000  0.32 0.21 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 
2005 0.39 0.21 0.21 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 
2010 0.47 0.21 0.21 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
2015 0.57 0.21 0.21 0.52 0.52 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
2020 0.69 0.21 0.21 0.62 0.62 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 
Table 12 :   Per capita carbon emissions
Table 13 :   GDP
In billion 
Rupees 
Percentage difference from BAU Scenario 
BAU  
Scenario 
Sim. 1 Sim. 1 
(TT) 
Sim. 2 Sim. 2 
(TT) 
Sim. 3 Sim. 3 
 (TT) 
Sim. 4 Sim. 4 
(TT) 
1990    3211.25  0.00   0.00 -1.24 -1.04 6.81 7.27 12.01 12.57 
1995    3927.65 -2.25 -1.99 -1.36 -1.15 6.19 6.74 10.47 10.92 
2000  4856.58 -4.42 -4.05 -1.55 -1.25 5.64 6.00   8.31 8.69 
2005    6201.46 -6.40 -6.01 -1.46 -1.13 3.66 4.11   4.96 5.16 
2010    8312.96 -6.80 -6.31 -1.38 -1.09 3.55 3.78   3.69 3.97 
2015 10939.08 -7.68 -7.20 -1.28 -1.05 2.90 3.09   3.61 3.96 
2020 14730.50 -8.28 -8.04 -1.20 -1.08 2.53 2.70  3.12 3.21 
In billion 
Rupees 
Percentage difference from BAU Scenario 
BAU  
Scenario 
Sim. 1 Sim. 1 
(TT) 
Sim. 2 Sim. 2 
(TT) 
Sim. 3 Sim. 3 
 (TT)  
Sim. 4 Sim. 4 
 (TT) 
1990 
 4380.11  0.00   0.00 -0.76 -0.63 6.69 6.79 11.83  11.91 
1995 
 5835.89 -1.64 -1.52 -0.82 -0.67 4.90 4.99   9.00 9.14 
2000  7489.40 -3.95 -4.10 -1.20 -1.24 4.04 4.14   6.47 6.62 
2005 
 9160.77 -5.25 -5.21 -1.17 -1.19 3.38 3.52   4.31 4.40 
2010 11865.33 -3.82 -3.70 -1.13 -1.02 2.61 2.62   3.43 3.53 
2015 15290.51 -4.46 -4.51 -1.06 -1.03 2.24 2.30   2.75 2.85 
2020 20130.18 -4.61 -4.52 -0.76 -0.88 1.83 1.86   1.98 2.05 
Table 14 :   Consumption
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Fig. 2 :   BAU : Growth rates of macrovariables
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BAU 
Scenario
Sim. 1 Sim. 1 
(TT) 
Sim. 2 Sim. 2       
(TT) 
Sim. 3 Sim. 3       
(TT) 
Sim. 4 Sim. 4       
(TT) 
1990 37.45 37.45 37.45 38.79 38.01 35.02 33.30 30.02 25.45 
1995 32.48 34.01 33.37 33.73 33.08 30.37 28.83 25.74 19.54 
2000 28.41 31.10 30.17 29.55 28.96 26.75 24.63 22.69 16.51 
2005 24.86 28.18 27.12 25.75 25.25 22.87 20.88 18.84 13.82 
2010 16.26 21.69 19.87 16.81 16.43 15.37 14.02 13.29 10.64 
2015 09.04 15.22 13.66 09.39 09.14 08.53 07.11 06.86 05.30 
2020 02.01 08.05 06.87 02.11 02.03 01.63 01.01 00.87 00.08 
Table 15 :   Poverty ratio (in percent)
BAU 
Scenario
Sim. 1 Sim. 1
(TT) 
Sim. 2 Sim. 2  
(TT) 
Sim. 3 Sim. 3
(TT) 
Sim. 4 Sim. 4       
(TT) 
1990 303.35 303.35 303.35 314.20 307.88 283.66 269.76 243.14 206.13 
1995 292.35 306.09 300.33 303.57 297.72 273.29 259.44 231.66 175.88 
2000 278.43 304.78 295.67 289.59 283.81 262.14 241.34 222.37 161.78 
2005 263.54 298.71 287.47 275.07 267.65 242.39 221.29 199.75 146.54 
2010 185.39 247.27 226.52 193.69 187.30 175.17 159.88 151.47 121.34 
2015 110.31 185.68 166.65 115.53 111.51 104.02   86.77 83.67 64.64 
2020 26.15 104.65 89.31   27.43   26.39   21.24  13.18   11.28 1.02 
Table 16 :   Number of poor (in million)
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Fig. 3 :  BAU  :  GDP/K & GDP/L
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Appendix 2
Model Equations, Variables and Parameters
Sectors : 1.  Agriculture 2.   Electricity 3.  Coal  4.  Refined Oil
                 5.  Natural Gas 6.   Crude-Petroleum 7.  Transport  8.  Energy-
Intensive Industries     9.  Other Industries 10. Consumer Goods
11. Services
Sets :
Sectors :
S = ( Agricult, Elec, Coal, Refoil, Nat-gas, Crude-Pet, Trans, Enerint, Otherind, Cons-good,
         Services )
Non-Agricultural Sectors :
NAS = ( Agricult, Elec, Coal, Refoil, Nat-gas, Crude-Pet, Trans, Enerint, Otherind, Cons-
good )
Non-Fixed Factor Sectors :
NFS = (  Elec, Trans, Enerint, Otherind, Cons-good, Services )
Non-Energy Sectors :
NES = (  Agricult,  Trans, Enerint, Otherind, Cons-good, Services )
Energy Sectors :
SES = ( Elec, Coal, Refoil, Nat-gas, Crude-Pet )
Primary Energy Sectors :
PES = ( Coal,  Nat-gas, Crude-Pet )
Non-electric Energy Sectors :
NEE = ( Coal, Refoil, Nat-gas, Crude-Pet )
Non-electric Fuels Sectors :
NEF = ( Coal, Refoil, Nat-gas  )
Exporting Sectors :
EXS = ( Agricult,  Coal, Refoil,  Trans, Enerint, Otherind, Cons-good, Services)
Non-exporting Sectors :
NXS = (Elec, Nat-gas, Crude-Pet)
Importing Sectors :
IMS = ( Agricult,  Coal, Refoil, Nat-gas, Crude-Pet, Enerint, Otherind, Cons-good )
Non-importing Sectors :
NMS = (Elec, Trans, Services )
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Regions :
RGN = ( rural, urban )
Sources of  Income ( land, fixed-factor, wage-labour, self-employed-labour, capital , transfer
payments) :
TYP =  ( l, f, w, s, k, tp )
Consumption Expenditure Classes
CEC = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
Income Classes (Percentiles)
H = ( h1 (10%), h2(10%),,h9(10%), h10(5%), h11(1%), h12(1%),,h15(1%) ]
Production Structure
(1) ( )[ ]
 
1/
Z*1N**aX ixixiixixiixixi
−
−
−+
−
= i ε NFS       
(2) )1/(1where,)(1*P
*P
*ZN ixix
ix
ixin
ixiz
ii +=


−
=
i ε NFS  
(3) iieiiziiniix X**tZ*PN*PX*P ++= i ε NFS 
 (Note : ωi = 0,  ∀ i ≠ 8 ) 
 
(4) ( )[ ]
 
1/
*1FN**aX ixixiixixiixixi f
−
−
−+
−
= i ε PES                     
(5) )1/(1where,)(1*P
*P
*NF ixix
ix
ixi
ixi
ii
fn
ff +=


−
=
i ε PES 
(6) iifiinfiix f*PNF*PX*P +=  i ε PES 
(7) ( )[ ]
 
1/
*1NF**X 44x44x4444
x
CP xxax
−
−
−+
−
=
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
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(8) )1/(1where,)(1*P
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4x4
4x66
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+=

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
−
=
+
(9) CP *)*tP(NF*PX*P 6e644nf44 cpqx ++=
(10) 11
11
1
1111
x
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x
xx
1/--
VA*)-1(
-
RS**aX ][ +=
(11) ,)(1*P
*P
*VARS
1x
1x1rs
1x1VA
11 


−
=
where σx1 = 1/ (1+ ρx1 )
(12) PX1 * X1 = Prs1 * RS1 + Pva1 * VA1
(13) 11
1
1
1111
rsrs
rs
rs
rs
1/-
-
*)-1(
-
EM**aRS ][ ldrs +=
(14) ,)(1*P
*P
*EM
1
11
1
1
rs
rsem
rs ldld 


−
=
where σrs1 = 1/ (1+ ρrs1 )
(15) Prs1 * RS1 = Pem1 * EM1 + Pld * ld 
(16) 11111111
emem
em
em
emem
1/-
-
EA*)-1(
-
N**EM ][ 1a +=
(17) ,)(1*P
*P
*EAN
1
11
11
1
em
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em ea
1 


−
=
where σem1 = 1/ (1+ ρem1 )
(18) Prs1 * RS1 = Pem1 * EM1 + Pld * ld 
(19) ( )[ ]
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nfnfnf
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(21) iiziinii Z*PN*PNF*Pnf += i ε NEE          
(22)  ( )[ ]
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(23) 
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
−
=
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(24) iiiiiiZ AV*PEA*PZ*P vaea += i ε NAS                           
(25) ( )[ ] ininiininiinini 1/N*1N**aN md −−−+−= i ε S
(26)  
)1/(1 where ,)(1*P
*P
*NN i
in
ii
i
ii n
nNd
inNm
inmd +=


−
= σ
i ε S
(27)          Pni * Ni = PNdi * Ndi + PNmi * Nmi i ε S
(28) ( )[ ]
 
1/
NE*1E**EA iEAiEAiiEAiEAiiEAiEAi a
−
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−+−= i ε S
(29) 
)1/(1where,)(1*P
*P
*NEE
iAEiEA
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iEAiE
iEAiNE
ii +=


−
=
i ε S
(30) iiNEiiiEA NE*PE*PEA*P 2q += i ε S
(31)    iVA1iVAiilsiVAiilwiVAiiKiVAi Ls*Lw*K**VA
/
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−


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
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−
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[ Note : δKi + δlwi + δlsi = 1 ] 
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
7)
(28)
(29)
(30)
1)
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(38) PNEi * NEi = ( Pqcl  + te * µcli ) * CLi + ( Pqro + te * µroi ) * ROi
+ ( Pqgs
 
+ te * µgsi ) * GSi i ε S
(39) ixxixxx
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where σexi = 1/ (1+ ρexi ) i  ε EXS 
(41) PXi * Xi = Pexi * EXi + Pddi * DDi i ε EXS 
(32)
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)
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(42) EX i = aexdi * [ PWexi / pwesi]ρexdi i ε EXS 
(43)         Xi = DDi i ε NXS
(44) PXi * Xi = Pddi * DDi i ε NXS 
(45) ( )[ ]
 
1/
DD*1M**aQ iqiqiiqi
q
iiqiqi
−
−
−+
−
= i ε IMS 
(46) ,)(1*P
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where σqi = 1/ (1+ ρqi ) i  ε IMS 
(47) iiiiii DD*PM*PP*Q ddmq += i ε IMS 
(48)         Qi = DDi i ε NMS 
(49) Pqi * Qi = Pddi * DDi i ε NMS
CO2 Emissions:
(50)        ECO2ng =  ∑
=
11
1i
µcli * CLi + ∑
=
11
1i
µgsi * GSi + ∑
=
11
1i
µroi * ROi + µcp   * CP 
 
+ ω8 * X8 + ∑
=
11
1i
ϕ i * Ci
(51)        gECO2  = ∑
=
11
ii
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gc*
(52) TECO2  = ECO2ng  +   ECO2g
(53)        PAYEM =  te * ECO2ng  
Prices (Exports , Imports and Intermediates)
(54) PWexi = ( Pexi * (1-exsubi ) ) / ER              i  ε EXS 
(55) Pmi = pwmi * ( 1+ tfmi ) *ER                                  i  ε IMS        
2 Emissions:
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(56) ER *)t(1*pw*aP jmnjm
11
1j
jiminm += ∑
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i ε S
(57) )t(1*P*aP jndjq
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7&1j
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i ε S
Factor_Prices,_Consumer_Prices_and_Price_Indices
(58) i
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i sLLtotlab
2i
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(59) Pci = Pqi * ( 1 + tfdi + te * ϕi ) i  ε S
(60)     CPIrg =    ( ∑
=
11
1i
Pci * Ci,rg ) / ( ∑
=
11
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Ci,rg  
 
) rg  ε RGN 
(61)     Wrg = ( λrg * CPIrg * dwrg )   / dcpirg rg  ε RGN 
(62)     PINDEX =  ∑
=
11
1i
pwts(i) * Pci
Factor Incomes 
Sectoral Factor Incomes : 
(63) l*PY ll,1 =
(64) iifif, f*PY = i ε PES                                                                                                                 
(65) )t(1*L*WY iwiwrgiw, −= i ε S
[ Note : Wrg = Wurban  for i  ε NAS & Wrg = Wrural for i  = agricult ] 
(66) )t(1*L*PY iwirglsi, ss −= i ε S
(67) )t(1*k*PY ikiikik, −= i ε S
(68)     GTR = ( gtra + gtrb ) * PINDEX  +  PAYEM       
(69)     WTR =  ( nct  +  nfi )  * ER 
(70)     Ytp =  ( GTR + WTR ) 
Rural and Urban Factor Incomes :       
(71) ∑
≠
=
11
1 t
ity,
 rg,ity,rgty, tpy
Y*alYH + arrg * Ytp ty  ε TYP, rg  ε RGN 
[Note: ∑rg alty,i,rg = 1 for ∀ i & ty (ty ≠ tp) ;  ∑rg arrg = 1]
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Income Distribution
Step 1 : Mapping of Factor Incomes onto incomes of the 15 income classes (percentiles). 
(72)      ∑= ty rgty,h,rgh, rgty,YH *Y h ε H, rg  ε RGN
[Note: Σh pih, ty, rg = 1] 
 
(73)       rgh,
h
rgh,rg Y*Y ∑= rg  ε RGN                                                  
(74) 2rgrgh,
h
rgh,rg )Y(Y*Vy −= ∑ rg  ε RGN 
Step 2 : Computing the mean and variance of log income, under the assumption  that  
 the distribution of population according to per capita income and per capita  
 consumption expenditure is bi-variate log normal. 
 
(75) ( )2YrgrgYrg 2
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+= rg  ε RGN                           
(77) Yrgrgrgcrg += rg  ε RGN 
(78) Yrgcrg *rg= rg  ε RGN 
 
Step 3 : Determining the shares of (i) population, (ii) consumption and (iii) total income  
 accruing to the households that fall under consumption expenditure level k for  
 k = 1,2, …,5. 
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Step 4 : Computing the per capita expenditure and income for the five expenditure classes. 
 
(82) ( ) 


+=
2c
rg
c
rgrg 2
1
expC rg  ε RGN 
(83) )()(CC
rg1,-krgk,rg1,-krgk,rgrgk, / −−= k ε CEC,  rg  ε RGN                      
(84) )(/)(YY rg1,-krgk,rg1,krgk,rgrgk, −−= −ϖϖ k ε CEC,  rg  ε RGN 
Step 5 :  Determining the sectoral consumption demands for each of the five expenditure  
classes using the Stone-Geary linear expenditure system. 
 
(85) 

 ∑−+=
J rg,k,jjrgk,rg,ki,rgk,i,irgk,i,i
PCPC*P ccc i ε S,  k  ε CEC,  rg  ε RGN 
 
Step 6 : Determining the sectoral consumption demands. 
(86)  rg,k,irgrgi, C*pop *)(C
5
1k rg1,-krgk,
∑
=
−= i ε S,  rg  ε RGN         
(87) Ci = ∑
rg
rgi,C i ε S
Savings
(88)    HSAV =    ∑
rg
poprg *  ∑
=
5
1k
)( rg1,-krgk, − * ( rgk,Y - rgk,C ) 
(89)    GSAV = ∑
=
11
1i
Ndi * ( ∑
=
11
1j
aji * tndj * Pqj )+ ∑
=
11
1i
Nm i * (∑
=
11
1j
am ji * tnm j * (wpm j *ER))
+ ( ∑
=
11
1i
tfdi * Pqi (IDi + Ci)) + ( ∑
=
11
1i
tfm i * (wpm i*ER) * M i )
+ ( ∑
=
11
1i
twi * Wrg * Lwi ) + ( ∑
=
11
1i
twi * Plsrg * Lsi )
+ ( ∑
=
11
1i
tki * Pki * Lki ) + PAYEM 
 -  ( ∑
=
11
1i
Pqi * cgi ) - (  GTR )                                          
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(90)     FSAV =   ∑
=
11
1i
( wpmi * Mi ) + ∑
=
11
1i
Nmi * ( ∑
=
11
1j
amji * wpmj )
- ( ∑
=
11
1i
PWexi * EXi ) – ( nct + nfi )     
Saving - Investment Balance
(91) HSAV + GSAV + ( FSAV * ER )  =∑
=
11
1i
IDi * Pqi* ( 1 + tfdi)
(92) IDi = adi * (pubinv + prinv)         i  ε S
(93) GRINVDi = pukvi * pubinv + prkvi * prinv          i  ε S
Commodity Market Clearing
(94) FDi = IDi + Ci + cgi i ε S
(95) Qi = ∑
=
11
7&1j
aij * Ndj + FDi i ε NES                                               
(96)  Q2 = ∑
=
11
1i
Ei + FD2
(97)  Q3 = ∑
=
11
1i
CLi + FD3
(98)  Q4 = ∑
=
11
1i
ROi + FD4
(99) Q5 = ∑
=
11
1i
GSi + FD5
(100)  Q6 = CP  +  FD6
Dynamics :
(101)       ki,t =  (1-depi ) *  ki,t-1 + GRINVDi i ε S
(102)       prkvi,t =  1- exp( 1- λ (RORi,t-1) )    i  ε S
(103)       RORi,t-1   =  Pki,t-1 / ∑
=
6
1j
Pkj,t-1 i ε S
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Endogenous Variables  : 
Xi
NFi
Gross domestic output 
Non-fixed factor inputs aggregate 
i ε S
i ε NEE 
RS1 Land-energy-materials aggregate in agriculture  
EM1 Energy-materials aggregate in agriculture  
Zi Energy-labor-capital aggregate i ε NAS 
Ni Non-energy intermediate inputs aggregate i ε S
Nmi Imported intermediates’ aggregate i ε S
Ndi Domestic intermediates’ aggregate i ε S
Vi Value-added i ε S
Lwi Input of wage-labour i ε S
Lsi Input of self-employed labour i ε NAS 
EAi Energy Aggregate i ε S
Ei Input of Electricity i ε S
NEi Non-electric fuels aggregate i ε S
CLi Input of Coal i ε S
GSi Input of  Natural-gas i ε S
ROi Input of Refined Oil i ε S
CP Input of Crude-Pet in the Refined Oil Sector  
DDi Domestic demand i ε S
EXi Export demand i ε EXS 
Mi Final Imports i ε IMS 
Qi Composite output i ε S
PNEi Price of non-electric fuels aggregate  i ε S
Pki Price of capital i ε S
Pvai Price of value-added i ε S
Peai Price of energy aggregate i ε S
Pni Price of non-energy intermediate inputs aggregate i ε S
Pzi Price of energy-labor-capital aggregate i ε NAS 
Pnfi Price of non-fixed factor inputs aggregate i ε NEE 
Prs1 Price of land-energy-materials aggregate in agriculture  
Pem1 Price of  energy-materials aggregate in agriculture  
Pl Price of land in agriculture  
Pfi Price of fixed factor i ε PES 
Pddi Price of domestic demand i ε S
Pexi Price of export demand i ε EXS 
Pxi Price of  domestic output i ε S
Pqi Price of composite output i ε S
PWexi Price (in foreign currency) of exports in the international 
market 
i ε EXS 
Pndi Price of domestic intermediates’ aggregate i ε S
Pnmi Price of imported intermediates’ aggregate i ε S
Pmi Price of Final imports i ε IMS
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ECO2ng CO2 emissions in the non-government sector 
 
ECO2g CO2 emissions in the government sector  
TECO2 Total CO2 emissions in the economy           
( TECO2 is variable in the base-run, but fixed in the simulations) 
te Carbon tax (Rs. / ton of carbon emissions) 
( te is fixed at zero in the base-run, but a variable in the 
simulations. ) 
PAYEM   Total Emission Payments  
Plsurban Remuneration to self-employed labour in the non-agricultural 
sectors 
 
Wrg Wage rate for wage-labour by region rg  ε RGN 
Pci Consumption Prices    i ε S
CPIrg Consumer price index by region rg  ε RGN 
PINDEX Overall price index  
Yty, i Factor incomes by sector ty  ε TYP,  i  ε S
GTR Government transfers  
WTR World Transfers  
YHty, rg Factor Incomes by region ty  ε TYP,   
rg  ε RGN 
Yh, rg Incomes by income classes h ε H,  rg  ε RGN 
rgY Mean Income rg  ε RGN 
Vyrg Variance of income rg  ε RGN 
Y
rg
Mean of log income rg  ε RGN 
Y
rg
Standard Deviation of log income rg  ε RGN 
c
rg Standard Deviation of  log   consumption rg  ε RGN 
c
rg Mean of log  consumption rg  ε RGN 
 
rg,k Share of population that falls under per capita   
expenditure level celk,rg 
rg  ε RGN 
rg,k Share of consumption accruing to the population 
 under per capita  expenditure level celk,rg    
k ε CEC, rg  ε RGN 
rgk,ϖ Share of income accruing to the population  
under per capita  expenditure level celk,rg 
k ε CEC, rg  ε RGN 
 
rgk,C Per capita consumption by  
consumption expenditure class and region 
k ε CEC, rg  ε RGN 
rgk,Y Per capita income by consumption  
expenditure class and region    
k ε CEC, rg  ε RGN 
rgk,i,C Consumption of commodity i  by consumption  
expenditure class and region 
i ε S,  k  ε CEC,  
rg  ε RGN 
Ci,rg Consumption of commodity i  by region    i ε S,   rg  ε RGN 
Ci Consumption of commodity i i ε S
HSAV Household Savings  
GSAV Government Savings
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HSAV Household Savings  
GSAV Government Savings  
 
FSAV 
 
Foreign Savings (in dollars) 
 
ER Exchange Rate  
IDi Investment demand by sector of origin i ε S
GRINVDi Gross real investment by sector of  destination i ε S
FDi Final demand by sector i ε S
RORi Relative rate of return on capital in sector i i ε S
Exogenous Variables  and Parameters : 
ki Capital stock in sector i   i ε S
l Supply of land in agriculture  
totlab Total labour supply in the non-agricultural sectors  
cgi Government consumption of commodity i i ε S
1Ls  Fixed supply of self-employed labour in agriculture  
fi Supply of fixed factors in the primary energy sectors i ε PES 
pubinv Aggregate public sector real investment  
prinv Aggregate private sector real investment  
dwrg Initial wage rate by region rg ε RGN 
depi Depreciation rate of capital in sector i i ε S
dcpirg Initial consumer price index by region rg ε RGN 
pwesi International price of export substitutes i ε S
pwmi International price of imports i ε S
Eco2q Annual allotment of CO2 emission quota  
peco2 Price of tradable emission permit ($ per ton)  
pwtsi Weights in the price index i ε S
gtra Government’s interest payments  
gtrb Government’s current transfers  
nct Net current transfers from rest of the world   
nfi Net factor income from rest of the world  
tndi Rate of tax on domestic intermediates i ε S
tnmi Rate of tax on imported intermediates i ε S
tfmi Rate of tax on final imports i ε S
exsubi Rate of subsidy on exports i ε S
tfdi Rate of tax on final demand   i ε S
tki Rate of tax on capital income i ε S
twi Rate of tax on wage and self-employed 
 labour income 
i ε S
al
 ty, i, rg Shares for allocation of sectoral factor incomes 
 to regions 
ty  ε TYP,  i  ε S, 
rg  ε RGN 
ar
 rg Shares for allocation of transfer payments to 
 regions 
rg  ε RGN 
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pih,ty,rg Factor income share by income class and region h ε H ,  ty  ε TYP,  
rg  ε RGN 
θh,rg Population shares by income class and region h ε H ,   rg  ε RGN 
κrg κ-value transforming the S.D. of log income to 
 S.D. of  log consumption 
rg  ε RGN 
νrg Variance constant in the S.D. of log income 
 equation by region 
rg  ε RGN 
αrg Intercept term in the consumption fuction by region rg  ε RGN 
βrg Slope term in the consumption fuction by region rg  ε RGN 
celk,rg Upper limit of consumption expenditure of class 
 k in region rg 
k ε CEC, rg ε RGN 
rg,ki, Consumption expenditure shares by sector, class 
 and region 
i ε S, k  ε CEC, 
rg  ε RGN 
rgk,i, Commited consumption expenditures  by 
 sector, class and region 
i ε S, k  ε CEC, 
rg  ε RGN 
poprg Population by region  rg  ε RGN 
aij amount of commodity i required to produce  
1 unit of domestic intermediate input aggregate 
 for sector j 
i ε S, j  ε S
amij amount of commodity i imports required to  
fulfill 1 unit of imported intermediate input 
aggrgate for sector j 
i ε S, j  ε S
adi Share of aggregate investment by sector of origin i ε S
prkvi Share of private investment by sector of destination i ε S
pukvi Share of public investment by sector of destination i ε S
λ Factor that ensures that the allocation ratios 
 (prkvi s ) add to one 
 
µcli CO2 emission from one unit of coal used i ε S
µroi CO2 emission from one unit of refined oil used i ε S
µgsi CO2 emission from one unit of natural gas used i ε S
µcp CO2 emission from one unit of crude-petroleum 
 used  
 
ωi CO2 emission per unit of  production of  
commodity i  
i ε S
ϕi CO2 emission per unit of household consumption 
 of commodity i 
i ε S
τi CO2 emission per unit of government consumption 
 of commodity i  
i ε S
σxi Elasticity of substitution at the X-level  
production function 
i ε S
σrs1 Elasticity of substitution at the RS-level  
p.f. in agriculture  
 
σem1 Elasticity of substitution at the EM-level p.f. 
 in agriculture 
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Numeraire : 
PINDEX Overall Price Index  
 
σnfi Elasticity of substitution at the NF-level  
production function 
 
i ε NEE 
σni Elasticity of substitution at the N-level  
production function 
i ε S
σzi Elasticity of substitution at the Z-level  
production function 
i ε NAS 
σvai Elasticity of substitution at the VA-level  
production function 
i ε S
σeai Elasticity of substitution at the EA-level  
production function 
i ε S
σnei Elasticity of substitution at the NE-level  
production function 
i ε S
σexi Elasticity of substitution at the EX-level  
production function 
i ε EXS 
σqi Elasticity of substitution at the Q-level  
production function 
i ε IMS 
δxi Share parameter of the X-level production  
function 
i ε S
δrs1 Share parameter of the RS-level p.f. in agriculture   
δem1 Share parameter of the EM-level p.f. in agriculture  
δnfi Share parameter of the NF-level production function i ε NEE 
δni Share parameter of the N-level production function i ε S
δzi Share parameter of the Z-level production function i ε NAS 
δvai Share parameter of the VA-level production function i ε S
δeai Share parameter of the EA-level production function i ε S
δnei Share parameter of the NE-level production function i ε S
δexi Share parameter of the EX-level production function i ε EXS 
δqi Share parameter of the Q-level production function i ε IMS 
axi Scale parameter of the X-level production function i ε S
ars1 Scale parameter of the RS-level p.f. in agriculture   
aem1 Scale parameter of the EM-level p.f. in agriculture  
anfi Scale parameter of the NF-level production function i ε NEE 
ani Scale parameter of the N-level production function i ε S
azi Scale parameter of the Z-level production function i ε NAS 
avai Scale parameter of the VA-level production function i ε S
aeai Scale parameter of the EA-level production function i ε S
anei Scale parameter of the NE-level production function i ε S
aexi Scale parameter of the EX-level production function i ε EXS 
aqi Scale parameter of the Q-level production function i ε IMS 
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It is obvious that data requirements for the CGE model developed for this study are huge and
diverse. In fact, published data rarely fit the requirement of the model. The data collected from
various publications had to go through several stages of processing before it became applicable
to the CGE model. Particularly difficult was the task of creating compatibility between different
sets of data coming from varied sources, using different base-years, classifications, and degrees
and types of disaggregation across sectors. The compatibility problem in pooling of data from
various sources was encountered at almost every step. We have given below a brief description
of the adjustments made in publised data at the various steps.
    Our CGE model has been calibrated to the benchmark equilibrium data set, represented in a
Social Accounting Matrix for the Indian economy for the year 1989-90. The basic data set for
the SAM has been obtained from the Central Statistical Organization - National Accounts
Statitstics of India (various issues) and the CSO (1997) - Input-Output Transactions Table -
1989-90. A host of other exogenous variables and parameters have been estimated from the
data available in various other published sources.
The 11x11 input-output transactions table
Our model is based on an eleven sector disaggregation of the Indian economy. The CSO-
IOTT provides a highly disaggregated 115 x 115 input-output matrix for the Indian economy
for the year 1989-90, the base-year of our model. Unfortunately, even in this 115 sectoral
divison Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas are clubbed together in sector no. 24. By using
guessestimates on the split ratios for the inputs and outputs of the Crude Petroleum and
Natural Gas sectors, obtained from the concerned statisticians at the CSO, New Delhi, we
first split the sector 24 of CSO-IOTT into two sectors, and thus generated a 116 x 116 I-O
matrix. We then worked out a mapping scheme (shown below) from the 116 sectors to our 11
sectors and thereafter produced an aggregated 11 x 11 I-O matrix. That gives us the inter-
industry flows as well as the final demand components for the 11 sectors.
Table A3-1 : Sector mapping scheme
Appendix 3
Sector 
No 
Sector Name CSO - IOTT Sectors 
1 AGRICULTURE 01-22 
2 ELECTRICITY 101 
3 COAL 23 
4 OIL 59 
5 NATURAL GAS 25 
6 CRUDE PETROLEUM 24 
7 TRANSPORT 104,105 
8 ENERGY INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 26-30, 53,61-64, 69, 71, 73-76, 
9 OTHER INTERMEDIATES 
incl. Capital Goods 
31-33, 47, 52, 54, 57, 58, 60, 65-
68, 70, 72, 77-100, 102, 103,107 
10 CONSUMER GOODS 034-046, 048-051, 055, 056 
11 SERVICES 106, 108-116 
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Capital and labour stocks
Data on capital stocks are available in the CSO-NAS(BS), but again not as per our sectoral
classification. We split the aggregated capital stocks with respect to our 11 sectors using the
value added proportions. The resulting capital stocks figures were not all compatible with the
capital incomes figures generated above using CSO-NAS (BS) and CSO-NAS-FI. Assuming
greater reliability of the capital incomes figures, we adjusted the capital stocks figures so that
the sectoral capital rental rates were realistic, as judged from other published data sources.
    The labour stock data is available in NSSO-45th Round. The labour stock data posed less of
a problem because, in their case, the sectoral distribution is not required. In the model, sectoral
capital stocks are fixed at exogenously given levels, but labour supply is fixed only in aggregate
terms. The only sector for which labour supply is fixed exogenously is agriculture, and the data
for this is available in NSSO-45th Round.
Note : LPR : Labour Participation Rate
           The growth rates for each of the quinquenniums are the annual growth rates.
Income distribution
Factor income shares by income percentiles for each the two regions  rural and urban  are
deducible from the income distribution data provided for 1975-76 and 1994-95 in Pradhan et al
(2000). We have used the 1994-95 income distribution data for deriving the factor income
shares for 1989-90, the base year of our model. It is generally agreed that income distribution
pattern changes very slowly in India. Hence, it is fair to assume that the income distribution
pattern of 1994-95 will approximate that of 1989-90.
Table A3-2 : Population, labour supply and labour participation rate
Year Pop. (in billion) Pop. – Growth
rate 
Lab. Sup. 
(in billion)
Lab. Sup.- 
Growth rate 
LPR 
1990 0.81  0.35  0.4321 
1995 0.90 2.11 0.41 3.16 0.4556 
2000 0.98 1.70 0.46 2.30 0.4694 
2005 1.06 1.57 0.50 1.67 0.4717 
2010 1.14 1.46 0.54 1.54 0.4737 
2015 1.22 1.36 0.58 1.43 0.4754 
2020 1.30 1.27 0.62 1.33 0.4769 
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Note : h1 to h9 : 10%  each ; h10 : 5% ; h11 to h15 : 1% each .
yself : income of self-employed ; ywage : wage income ; ycap : income from capital ;
yland : income from land ;  yff : income from fixed factors ;
ynonp : non-production related incomes (i.e., transfer payments) .
Urban 
yself ywage ycap yland yff ynonp 
h1 0.0020 0.0559 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.1638 
h2 0.0030 0.0585 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.1120 
h3 0.0080 0.0619 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 0.0798 
h4 0.0930 0.0643 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0939 
h5 0.1020 0.0727 0.0165 0.0165 0.0165 0.0711 
h6 0.0380 0.1283 0.0313 0.0313 0.0313 0.1443 
h7 0.0470 0.1335 0.0529 0.0529 0.0529 0.1601 
h8 0.0850 0.1640 0.0937 0.0937 0.0937 0.0980 
h9 0.1560 0.1661 0.1659 0.1659 0.1659 0.0645 
h10 0.0950 0.0229 0.1608 0.1608 0.1608 0.0080 
h11 0.0470 0.0206 0.0440 0.0440 0.0440 0.0016 
h12 0.0570 0.0153 0.0544 0.0544 0.0544 0.0010 
h13 0.0540 0.0150 0.0688 0.0688 0.0688 0.0009 
h14 0.1040 0.0110 0.0950 0.0950 0.0950 0.0007 
h15 0.1090 0.0100 0.2007 0.2007 0.2007 0.0003 
Rural 
yself ywage ycap yland yff ynonp 
h1 0.0000 0.1195 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 0.0099 
h2 0.0000 0.1496 0.0000 0.0000 0.0061 0.0089 
h3 0.0000 0.1827 0.0000 0.0000 0.0134 0.0096 
h4 0.0000 0.1925 0.0000 0.0000 0.0238 0.0091 
h5 0.0000 0.2757 0.0000 0.0000 0.0375 0.0094 
h6 0.0583 0.0800 0.0881 0.0566 0.0566 0.1995 
h7 0.0924 0.0000 0.1263 0.1002 0.0802 0.2223 
h8 0.1465 0.0000 0.1263 0.1984 0.1160 0.1709 
h9 0.1930 0.0000 0.2816 0.1825 0.1825 0.1798 
h10 0.1525 0.0000 0.1393 0.1398 0.1498 0.0942 
h11 0.0461 0.0000 0.0357 0.0413 0.0413 0.0389 
h12 0.0490 0.0000 0.0375 0.0452 0.0452 0.0176 
h13 0.0575 0.0000 0.0422 0.0515 0.0515 0.0115 
h14 0.0842 0.0000 0.0505 0.0633 0.0633 0.0115 
h15 0.1205 0.0000 0.0725 0.1212 0.1312 0.0069 
Table A3-4 :   Factor income share by income percentiles
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LES parameters for the demand functions
In our model there are 5 rural and 5 urban consumption expenditure classes. To
econometrically estimate the LES parameters for each of these 10 classes from time
series data would have been a daunting task. So we decided to make use of an existing
set of parameters, from another study, Dahl (1989). The latter gives the committed
expenditures and the expenditure shares for the ten rural and urban consumption
expenditure classes, as per a six-sectors classification  agriculture, capital goods,
intermediate goods, public infrastrucure, consumer goods and services. Moreover, the
committed expenditures are at the 1973-74 prices. These are first inflated to the 1989-
90 prices using the wholesale price indices obtained from the ES (Economic Survey
(various issues), Government of India). To obtain the demand function parameters for
our nine sectors we first construct a 9x6 transformation matrix which maps the 6x1
vector of the demand parameters (for each expenditure group) in the six-commodities
classification, onto a 9x1 vector of demand parameters for our nine commodity groups.
The transformation matrix is prepared by using the final consumption demand vector
of the input-output transactions table of the CSO-IOTT. From the latter we could
determine the elements of the transformation matrix  i.e., proportions of each of the 6
sectors of Dahl (1989) going into the various sectors of our nine-sectors scheme.
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Substitution elasticities for the production functions
The substitution elasticities of the production functions in the nested production
structure have taken from Babiker et al (2001), wherever possible . (We have followed
closely, but not entirely, the nesting of the production structure in the EPPA model
presented in Babiker et al, 2001). The substitution elasticities, between the domestic
and imported intermediates aggregates at the N level, and between capital, wage-
labour and self-employed labour at the VA level, have been taken from Ojha (1997).
Finally, the source for the CES (σq ) and CET (σex) elasticities in the trade aggregation
functions is Pradhan and Sahoo (2002).
Urban 
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 
Agricult 0.6599 0.5039 0.3979 0.3025 0.2000 
Elec 0.0014 0.0020 0.0021 0.0033 0.0128 
Coal 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Refoil 0.0071 0.0076 0.0176 0.0375 0.0550 
Nat-gas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Crude-Pet 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Trans 0.0810 0.1204 0.1181 0.1067 0.1092 
Enerint 0.0024 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0033 
Otherint 0.0316 0.0375 0.0425 0.0463 0.0739 
Cons-good 0.1049 0.1837 0.2420 0.2485 0.2540 
Services 0.1116 0.1423 0.1772 0.2526 0.2917 
Rural 
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 
Agricult 0.6594 0.5472 0.4013 0.3316 0.1928 
Elec 0.0011 0.0014 0.0015 0.0017 0.0128 
Coal 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Refoil 0.0027 0.0033 0.0031 0.0124 0.0358 
Nat-gas 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Crude-Pet 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Trans 0.0130 0.0153 0.0265 0.0372 0.1035 
Enerint 0.0008 0.0009 0.0010 0.0014 0.0019 
Otherint 0.1113 0.1274 0.1333 0.1318 0.1231 
Cons-good 0.1048 0.1830 0.2536 0.2814 0.2824 
Services 0.1068 0.1214 0.1796 0.2024 0.2476 
Table A3-5 :   Expenditure shares by consumption expenditure classes
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Carbon emission coefficients
For carbon emission coefficients, the source we have used is Yang et al (1996). Yang et al
(1996) provide figures for coefficients of energy contents in India for coal, crude petroleum,
natural gas, refined oil in exajoule per million US$ at 1985 prices. We convert these energy
content coefficients to exajoule per million rupees at 1990 prices using the appropriate exchange
rate and price indices from the ES. These are then multiplied by the coefficients of carbon contents
in million tonnes per exajoule, also given in Yang et al (1996) to arrive at the coefficients of
carbon contents in million tonnes per million rupees. Carbon is emitted in the process of output
generation as well, in the cement industry, which is a part of the energy intensive sector, in our
classification. Carbon emission coefficient per unit of output produced in this sector is obtained
from Murthy, Panda and Parikh (1997). Carbon emission coefficients for private and government
consumption are also taken from Murthy, Panda and Parikh (1997).
Table A3-7 :   Emission Coefficients (tonne per rupee)
σcoil σne σea σva σn σz σx σnf σem σrs σq σex 
Agricult  0.95 0.50 1.10 1.50  0.60  0.30 0.75 1.39 0.92 
Elec 0.30 0.90 0.50 1.20 1.50 0.40 0.10      
Coal  0.95 0.50 0.97 1.50 0.40 0.60 0.10   1.62 0.92 
Refoil  0.95 0.50 0.96 1.50 0.40 0.10 0.10   2.00 0.92 
Nat-gas  0.95 0.50 0.98 1.50 0.40 0.60 0.10   1.62
Crude-pet  0.95 0.50 0.98 1.50 0.40 0.60 0.10   1.62 0.92 
Trans  0.95 0.50 1.60 1.50 0.40 0.10     0.50 
Enerint  0.95 0.50 1.10 1.50 0.50 0.10    3.36 0.92 
Otherint  0.95 0.50 1.60 1.50 0.50 0.10    1.72 0.92 
Cons-good  0.95 0.50 1.10 1.50 0.40 0.10    2.24 0.92 
Services  0.95 0.50 1.50 1.50 0.40 0.10     0.55 
Table A3-6 :   Substitution elasticities
µcl µro µgs µcp ω ϕ τi
Agricult 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00000008 0.00000267
Elec 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00029913 0.00074355
Coal 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00018919 0.00416302
Refoil 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.04385124 0.00000274 0.00000409
Nat-gas 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00000000 0.00095317
Crude-pet 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00000000 0.00000000
Trans 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00001167 0.00001282
Enerint 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00000372 0.00024586 0.00013460
Otherint 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00000462 0.00000182
Cons-good 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00000153 0.00016765
Services 0.17663159 0.04433592 0.02081120 0.00000022 0.00000010
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